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Since its inception in the late 1970s, China's family-planning campaign has
included such harsh measures as forced abortion and sterilization. The
campaign has also exacerbated social practices such as female infanticide and
the abandonment of infant girls. These measures and practices have been
criticized for violating international conventions on the rights of women and
female children.' The Chinese government has categorically denied
responsibility for the violations, which it claims are either the vestiges of
"backwards" traditions or isolated incidents committed by zealous local
officials. In any case, such practices are said to be rare and "by no means
represent the mainstream of overall efforts." 2
In this paper, I examine this denial of government responsibility. The
government of China, in its zeal to achieve reduction in the nation's average
birth rate,3 is complicit in in the violence against women and female children.
The government's failure to address these violations is in part due to the
supremacy of Communist Party directives over codified laws. According to
the Chinese Constitution, Communist Party directives stand above both
legislative and judicial process, and supersede the laws that purport to protect
women and female children. In Part I, I reconstruct the top-down process by
which China's national family-planning policy was adopted and implemented
in a manner subject to neither legislative review nor existing legal restrictions.
I explain how this policy pressures local officials to meet centrally-dictated
quotas at great cost to women, and how and why government officials and the
police forcibly detain women for abortions or sterilizations, beat those who
resist, confiscate their property, and demolish their houses. In most cases, it
is no one but government family-planning officials working toward their birth
quotas who terrorize women and their families into submission.
In Part II, I examine how the government endorses violence against women
and female infants by either authorizing coercive measures or failing to
prosecute local officials who violate women's legal rights. I explain how other
1. Documenting the exact scale of the use of violence against women and infant girls is difficult due
to controls on information concerning this sensitive matter, but available information, some of which will
be used in the following analysis, suggests it is prevalent and routine. For case documentation of the use
of violence in China's family-planning campaign, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, CAUGHT BETWEEN
TRADITION AND THE STATE: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHINESE WOMEN 32-59 (1995)
[hereinafter CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE]; and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN
IN CHINA: IMPRISONED AND ABUSED FOR DISSENT 1 (1995) [hereinafter WOMEN IN CHINA].
2. See Wang Xin, Population vs. Development: Challenge of the New Century, BEIUING REV., May
1-7, 1995, at 15 [hereinafter Population vs. Development].
3. Official statistics indicate that China reduced its population growth rate from 25.83 per thousand
in 1970 to 11.45 per thousand in 1993. Id. at 12. The average Chinese family size has fallen by about 60%
in the past two decades and women have, on average, between two and three children. Shanti R. Conly
& Sharon L. Camp, China's Family Planning Program: Challenging the Myths, I COUNTRY STUDY SERIES,
at 1 (1992).
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government policies exacerbate the need for coercive enforcement of birth-
control policies. These other policies create economic and social incentives for
families to resist government quotas and restrictions, while simultaneously
erecting obstacles for women seeking protection from coerced compliance.
In recent years China has, for the first time, become a signatory to various
international human rights declarations on reproductive rights and the rights
of women and children. In Part III, I examine the international norms that
China has promised to respect, and demonstrate how the family-planning policy
and practices violate these norms. I argue that if China is to honor its
commitments and comply with international human rights standards, it must
readjust its policy, abandon parts of it, and halt certain practices. In Part IV,
I explore policy alternatives.
I. THE POLICY AND ITS TOOLS
A. One Birth per Couple: A National Priority
In the early 1950s, Party Chairman Mao Zedong joined the Soviets in
rejecting Malthusian demographic determinism,' and advocated enlarging the
population for ideological reasons. China instituted a population policy that
encouraged women to give birth to more children. The policy slogan was:
"The more babies the more glorious are their mothers." The famine in the
early 1960s and the severe economic hardships of the late 60s and early 70s,
however, shattered the optimistic growth ideology. By the early 1970s, the
government had a new slogan: "Later, farther apart, and fewer" [wan, xi,
shao]. The government urged urban and rural couples to limit the number of
children they had to two and three, respectively.5
When Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping started his drive for
economic reform, China felt its "population crisis" more acutely. In order to
proceed with Deng's "socialist modernization," which stressed economic
efficiency, the Party made a national priority of lowering the birth rate
drastically and quickly. In 1979, Deng announced that official policy would
promote the norm of the one-child family.6 The population reduction policy
was set out in a series of Communist Party Committee and State Council
resolutions and directives, provincial regulations and, more recently, national
legislation.
4. Malthus anticipated disastrous overpopulation, and vigorously advocated measures to slow
population growth. See Amartya Sen, Population: Delusion and Reality, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Sept. 22,
1994, at 62.
5. For a general historical overview of Communist Party family-planning policies, see PENNY KANE,
THE SECOND BILLION: POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING IN CHINA (1987).
6. STEVEN W. MOSHER, A MOTHER'S ORDEAL at vii (1993); Conly & Camp, supra note 3, at 8.
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In 1980, the Central Party Committee called for limiting each couple to
one birth.7 The stated purpose of this policy was to mobilize the people to
control population quantity and improve its quality.' The Central Party
Committee and the State Council announced that "controlling population
growth is an important strategic issue facing our country's modern socialist
construction." 9 The 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China
stipulated that the entire country should promote family planning, 0 and made
it a duty of all couples to practice birth control.'" The 1980 Marriage Law
also made "family planning" an obligation of couples. 2 The Marriage Law
forbids marriage before the age of twenty-two for males and twenty for
females, calling for "late marriage and late birth" (wan hun wan yu). 3
With this objective set, the central government 4 had to adjust its policies
to enhance the prospects for successful implementation. By the early 1980s,
a number of factors encouraged additional births within families and led to
what the government perceived to be unsatisfactory compliance with the "one
birth" policy. These included the dissolution in the late 1970s of the collective
"People's Communes," a system of production and political control in rural
China, and the granting of more economic freedom to rural families. ' In
early 1982, the central government decided to implement more stringent
enforcement measures, 6 some of which remain in effect today. The Central
Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council issued a joint
directive, ordering the provincial governments to adopt strict methods of policy
implementation.' 7 A second joint directive issued in 1991, the "Decision on
7. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihua Shengyu Gongzuo Di Zhishi
[Directive by the Central Communist Party Committee and the State Council Regarding Further
Implementing Family Planning], [hereinafter Joint Directive] (adopted Feb. 9, 1982), ZHONGUO RENMIN
GONGHEGUO FALU FAGUI QUANSHU [THE COMPLETE BOOK OF LAWS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS IN THE
P.R.C.] 908.
8. See Guowuyuan Pizhuan Guojia Jihua Shengyu Weiyuanhui Tong Youguan Bumen Zhize Fengong
Di Yijian Di Tong Zhi [State Council Endorses the Division of Responsibility Between the State Family
Planning Committee and Other Agencies], (adopted July 31, 1981), ZHONGUO RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU
FAGUI QUANSHU [THE COMPLETE BOOK OF LAWS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS IN THE P.R.C.] 907. initially,
population "quality" did not particularly refer to some biological genetic superiority. Rather, it simply
referred to healthier mothers and babies and a higher average standard of living. But later, as discussed
below, a more pronounced eugenic program would be introduced to "improve" population "quality."
9. Joint Directive, supra note 7, at 908.
10. XIANFA [Constitution] art. 25. (1982) (P.R.C.).
11. Id. art. 49.
12. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyinfa [Marriage Law of the P.R.C.] art. 12 (1980), available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, CHINAL File [hereinafter Marriage Law].
13. Id. art. 5.
14. By "central government," I refer to the Central Party Committee, the State Council, and the State
Council's ministries. These agencies, particularly the Central Party Committee, are the central decision-
making bodies. The National People's Congress normally rubber-stamps their decisions. In recent years,
the Party has continued to dominate national government administration, though some separation has
appeared at the local level. For the same reason, I use "central government" and "the Chinese state"
interchangeably.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
16. See Joint Directive, supra note 7, at 908.
17. The Joint Directive, however, gave discretion to provincial governments to allow rural couples
with "practical difficulties" to have second births, while forbidding a third birth under any condition. See
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Stepping Up Family Planning Work and Strictly Controlling Population
Growth," again urged provincial governments to tighten enforcement."
According to the rationale that the government has given to justify its
policy to the people, population control is the most important step toward a
higher standard of living. In the official view, the only alternative to population
control is poverty, high infant mortality, and malnutrition. 9 Unbridled
population growth, the state warns, retards economic development, depresses
the standard of living, keeps infant mortality high, and perpetuates poverty.2 °
According to this view, compulsory population reduction is an urgent necessity
and should be achieved even if the costs to families are high.
B. Legal and Political Status of the Population Policy
In China, Communist Party directives are equivalent or superior to
legislation and codified laws. The absolute leadership of the Central
Communist Party is one of the four cardinal principles that rules China,
according to the 1982 Constitution. 2' This means that the Party stands above
Joint Directive, supra note 7, at 909. This was seen as an attempt to respond to resistance and tension that
the policy had provoked, particularly in rural areas in the early 1980s.
18. Zhonggong Zhongyang. Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiaqiang Jihua Shengyu Guong Zuo Yange
Kongzhi Kenkou Zengzhang de Juedeng [Decision on Stepping up Family Planning Work and Strictly
Controlling Population Growth], ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU FuGuI QUANSHU [THE COMPLETE
BOOK OF LAWS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS IN THE P.R.C.] 911-12 (199 1) [hereinafter Decision on Stepping
Up Family Planning Work].
19. For example, the State Council's 1991 report on "Human Rights in China," known as the "White
Paper," claimed that "China has only two alternatives in handling its population problem: to implement
the family planning policy or to allow blind [sic] growth in births. The former choice enables children to
be born and grow up healthily [sic] and live a better life, while the latter one leads to unrestrained
expansion of population so that the majority of the people will be short of food and clothing, while some
will even tend to die young. Which of the two pays more attention to human rights and is more humane?
The answer is obvious." INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PRC, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CHINA (1991), reprinted in BEIJING REV., Nov. 4-10, 1991, at 38) [hereinafter 1991 WHITE PAPER].
This statement emphasizes a direct, causal link between population reduction and prosperity. This view
was echoed recently in a Beijing Review commentary: "Since China adopted a population control policy
in the early 1970s, experts believe that 300 million fewer people have been born .... Meanwhile, state
statistics show that the country's per capita annual income shot up from 235 yuan in 1970 to 2,200 yuan
in 1994. This success cannot be separated from effective population control .... " Population vs.
Development, supra note 2, at 12.
20. However, this correlation does not imply that coercive birth-control measures are the only effective
way to combat these problems. Expanding educational and professional opportunities for women, improving
basic health and nutrition, providing for security in old age, stimulating economic productivity and, more
importantly, distributing social goods fairly, are all effective solutions to these problems. And these steps
are eventually more effective in reducing and stabilizing population size. See generally Paul Ehrlich et al.,
What It Will Take, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 52, 54; Sen, supra note 4, at 62. The U.N. General
Assembly has also recognized the close relationship between sustainable population and development
policies and women's empowerment and expanded opportunities for education and employment. Report
of the International Conference on Population and Development, U.N. International Conference on
Population and Development, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994).
21. The preamble to the Constitution of 1982 states that "[ulnder the leadership of the Communist
Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of
all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship." XIANFA [Constitution]
preamble, 1 7 (1982). The leadership of the Communist Party, the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Zedong thought, the preservation of socialism, and the continuation of the proletarian dictatorship are
commonly known as the four cardinal principles of the constitution.
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legislative and judicial processes. The Party dictates lawmaking; its directives
can change existing laws or supersede them, determining whether a particular
law is to be enforced. The Central Party Committee has no legal or judicial
limits on its powers and it makes policies as it sees fit."2
In fact, no single, coherent law has ever been enacted to regulate family
planning, although regulations applicable to family planning have appeared in
other laws. These include the 1980 Marriage Law,' the 1992 Law Protecting
Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI),24 and the 1994 Maternal and Infant
Health Care Law (MIHCL). The most recent effort to enact a national
family-planning law, initiated in 1991, was later abandoned. China's population
policy was under heavy international criticism at the time, and the national
government could not have enacted a family-planning law without inviting
international scrutiny.
The making of China's family-planning policy has thus been a top-down
process, and its implementation a penetrating one. Through massive social
engineering, the policy has demanded restrictions on intimate aspects of
individuals' lives.'z Its strategies and objectives, including annual birth quotas
for each region, are designed by the central government authorities and
delegated to local offices.27 Since the family-planning policy itself has never
been codified, it is implemented not according to the rule of law, but rather
according to rule by party directives. Government officials are assigned to
handle all cases and mete out punishments. Few opportunities are provided for
legal representation, hearings, appeals, or judicial review.
22. For an instructive discussion of the roles of law and the constitution in China, see Jerome Alan
Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q. 794 (1978).
23. Marriage Law, supra note 12.
24. Law Protecting Women's Rights and Interests (adopted by the Fifth Annual Session of the Seventh
National People's Congress, Apr. 3, 1992), XINHUA Domestic Service, Oct. 27, 1994, available in FBIS-
CHI-92-072-S, Apr. 14, 1992, at 29 [hereinafter LPWRI].
25. Law on Maternal, Infant Health Care Reported (adopted Oct. 27, 1994), XINHUA Domestic
Service, Oct. 27, 1994, available in FBIS-CHI-94-211, Nov. 1, 1994, at 29 [hereinafter MIHCL].
26. National Report of the People's Republic of China on Population and Development for the
International Conference on Population and Development (unpublished report on file with author)
[hereinafter P.R.C. Report to Cairo Conference on Population and Development]. The official position
on the relation between individual reproductive rights and society's interests is as follows:
[Iln exercising [the right to reproductive freedom], the individuals and couples should take into
full account the best interests of the present and future children in their families as well as their
obligations and responsibility to society. For countries where the speed of population growth has
adversely affected the socio-economic development, the formulation and implementation of proper
policies to control rapid population growth with relevant population targets would better serve
the aim of protecting the right to survival and development of the people.
Id. at 59.
27. "People's government at each level all [act] according to . . . the population control target set
forth by the requirements set forth by these regulations and the higher state authorities." Hebei Sheng Jihua
Shengyu Tiaoli [Hebei Family Planning Regulations] art. 10, (adopted by the Standing Committee of the
Seventh Hebei People's Congress, Mar. 14, 1989), 1990 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR BOOK
OF CHINA] 422 [hereinafter Hebei Family Planning Regulations]. "People's government at each level shall
adopt its population target ... according to the national and provincial plans. "Jilin Sheng Jihua Shengyu
Tiaoli [Jilin Family Planning Regulations] art. 5 (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Jilin
People's Congress, July 21, 1988), 1989 ZHONGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR BOOK OF CHINA] 369
[hereinafter Jilin Family Planning Regulations].
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The link between China's birth control policy and violence against women
and girls is in part a product of this top-down process and the supremacy of
state policy over law. Though women and children are endowed with some
legal rights, such as those set forth in the LPWRI and MIHCL,28 the state
may infringe upon them since there are no individual rights superior to the four
cardinal principles of the Constitution.29 All legal rights of individuals are
subordinated to the state's interest at any given moment.
Local authorities are expected to implement the birth control policy and
keep births within quotas determined by the central government. Their success
in meeting the quota in their region is seen by their superiors as an index of
their "political performance" or as credits for promotion.30 Failure to make
a quota entails the risk of disciplinary sanctions, demotion, or a reduction in
salary.3" These circumstances enhance the likelihood that the use of physical
force to limit births is politically motivated.
This top-down policy-making and enforcement process lacks public
deliberation, and fails to include input from health experts, demographers,
educators, and affected social groups, especially women and peasants. Such
input might enable the government to craft a more workable policy. This kind
of public deliberation is needed in dealing with sensitive issues such as who
should be allowed to carry a pregnancy to term and how couples should plan
their reproductive activities and their professional and economic lives. The top-
down process tends to be blind to Chinese social reality in the late 20th
century. The central government underestimated the strength of popular
resistance the policy would have to overcome, and government agents have
only been able to meet policy goals through coercion.
C. The Enforcement Measures
The "one birth" policy as spelled out in central government resolutions,
directives, and provincial regulations can be summarized as follows (specifics
vary slightly between provinces and autonomous minority regions):
(1) Couples should apply for birth permits before they try to conceive a
child.32
28. LPWRI, supra note 24; MIHCL, supra note 25.
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Hebei Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 11; Hunan ShengJihua Shengyu
Tiaoli [Hunan Family Planning Regulations] art. 6, (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh
Hunan People's Congress, December 3, 1989), 1990 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR BOOK OF
CHINA] [hereinafter Hunan Family Planning Regulations]; Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note
27, art. 6; Shangdong Sheng Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Shandong Family Planning Regulations] art. 4, (adopted
by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Shandong People's Congress, July 20, 1988), 1989 ZHONGUO
FALu NIANJIN [LAW YEAR BOOK OF CHINA] 419 [hereinafter Shandong Family Planning Regulations].
31. See, e.g., Hebei Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 30 (stipulating that, if failure
to make quota continues into second year, responsible officials will lose their positions).
32. See. e.g., Hunan Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 21; Shandong Family Planning
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(2) At least one spouse is required to use "long term" and "effective"
contraception after having the permitted number of children.33 Women
are to use an IUD after having the permitted number of children.34
(3) Those who proceed with unauthorized pregnancies, especially after they
have already had the permissible number of births, must have their
pregnancies terminated. After out-of-plan births, one spouse must be
sterilized.35
These measures are guided by quantitative birth quotas (the number of
permitted births per year for a particular community), that are normally
assigned by the central authorities to each province, autonomous region, and
major municipality. Such quotas are further subdivided among provinces,
townships, villages, and working units. For example, in 1992, the State
Council issued a "Ten-Year Plan" and "The Eighth Five-Year Plan,"
specifying the population quotas that each provincial government was expected
to meet.36 According to the "Eighth Five-Year Plan," for example, population
growth in Beijing between 1991 and 1995 was not to exceed 730,000, a
growth-rate cap of 13.1 % per year;37 the population of Tibet was to grow
by no more than 230,000, a cap of 19.91% per year; and in Sichuan,
population growth was not to exceed 7,160,000, with growth limited to
12.91% per year.38
Though it has been known as the "one child policy," the national average
targeted number of births per couple has actually been slightly higher. Rural
couples in many provinces are allowed to have a second child if, for example,
Regulations, supra note 30, art. 14. Couples may have to wait for years for permission to conceive,
depending on the number of couples planning to have babies in a given community.
33. See, e.g., Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Guangxi Zhuang Minority
Autonomous Region Family Planning Regulations] art. 17, (adopted by the Standing Committee of the
Seventh Autonomous People's Congress, Sept. 17, 1988), 1989 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR
BOOK OF CHINA] [hereinafter Guangxi Family Planning Regulations]; Shanxi Sheng Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli
[Shanxi Family Planning Regulations] art. 14, (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Shanxi
People's Congress, Sept. 22, 1989), 1990 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR BOOK OF CHINA],
[hereinafter Shanxi Family Planning Regulations].
34. See, e.g., Hunan Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 25; Shandong Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 30, art. 18.
35. See, e.g., Gansu Sheng Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Gansu Family Planning Regulationsl art. 17,
(adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Gansu People's Congress, Nov. 28, 1989), 1990
ZHONGGUO FALU NiANJ N [LAW YEAR BOOK OF CHINA] [hereinafter Gansu Family Planning Regulations];
Shanxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 14.
36. Guowuyuan Guanyu Xiada Shinianguihua he "Bawu" Jihua Fengdigu Renkou Zhibiao de Tongzhi
[Notification by the State Council Regarding the Ten-Year Plan and the Eighth Five-Year Plan Regional
Birth Quota] (adopted Jan. 6, 1992), ZHONGHUA RENMIN GRONGHEGUO FALU FAGUI QUANSHU [THE
COMPLETE BOOK OF LAWS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS OF THE P.R.C.] 914-16.
37. Id. at 915.
38. Id.
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their first child was a daughter.39 A third child is, however, strictly forbidden
under any circumstances.'
The penalties and consequences of noncompliance with the policy fall under
several categories:
(1) Penalties openly imposed by the policy: stiff fines;4' disqualification
for benefits such as subsidized child day care, health care, housing and
education;42 administrative demotion and dismissal from employment.
4 3
(2) Penalties and psychological intimidation sanctioned by the policy:
policy-created pressures from co-workers or fellow-villagers;"
intimidation and humiliation, including mandatory study sessions, visits by
authorities, and public posting and monitoring of menstrual periods.45
(3) Violence used by government agents: physical brutality and property
destruction, including detention, beatings, and the demolition of residences
by local officials, militia acting in a governmental capacity, and the
police.'
Enforcement varies from region to region,47 partly according to the
limited discretion of local officials and the social norms within each rural unit
and workplace. In some areas, people who do not comply with the policy may
39. In exceptional circumstances, more births may be permitted. The circumstances vary between
provinces, and include having had a first child with a non-hereditary disability; both spouses being the only
child of their parents; both spouses having returned to China from overseas; being a minority member;
and being a resident of a rural mountain region where there is a shortage of laborers. See Tianjin Shi Jihua
Shengyu Tiaoli [Tianjin Family Planning Regulations], arts. 7, 8, (adopted by the Standing Committee of
the Eleventh Tianjin People's Congress, Nov. 2, 1988), in 1989 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR
BOOK OF CHINA] 341 [hereinafter Tianjin Family Planning Regulations]; Heilongjiang Sheng Jihua Shengyu
Tiaoli [Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations], arts. 7, 8, (adopted by the Standing Committee of the
Seventh Heilongjiang People's Congress, Dec. 13, 1989), in 1990 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR
BOOK OF CHINA] 457 [hereinafter Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations]; Shandong Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 30, arts. 9, 10.
40. See Joint Directive, supra note 7.
41. See, e.g., Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, arts. 24, 25; Shanxi Family
Planning Regulations, supra note 33, arts. 28, 29.
42. See, e.g., Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 22; Shanxi Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 33, art. 18.
43. See, e.g., Shanxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 30; Heilongjiang Family
Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 29.
44. Certain local regulations make co-workers and fellow-villagers punishable (by withholding their
bonuses, land contracts, or welfare subsidies) if one member of the community violates the policy. See,
e.g., Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 30; Jilin Family Planning Regulations,
supra note 27, art. 27.
45. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE. supra note 1, at 36-57. For a chilling account
of public pressure on women to abort their out-of-plan pregnancies, see STEVEN W. MOSHER, A MOTHER'S
ORDEAL 261-85 (1993).
46. See WOMEN IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 1. In rural areas, the use of coercion seems to be more
prevalent. This is partly due to a lapse of government control in rural areas because of the dissolution of
the "People's Commune," and partly due to more stubborn resistance by peasants to family planning. See
infra Part II.B. 1-2.
47. See generally Joan Kaufman et al., Family Planning Policy and Practice in China: A Study of Four
Rural Counties, 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 707, 724-27 (1989) (finding enforcement varies in different
areas-not all women forced to wear IUDs, or to undergo abortion and sterilization).
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be subjected to severe penalties, including physical assault and property
destruction.4 In other areas, even the penalties imposed by national and
regional policies may not be enforced.49
In the early stages of implementation, local officials enjoyed significant
discretion in enforcing the policy, with some fluctuations in the degree of
pressure from the center for compliance.50 When politically decentralized
policy implementation failed to produce the desired results, the Communist
Party Central Committee and the State Council decided to mobilize the huge
government bureaucracy to enforce compliance. The 1991 "Decision on
Stepping Up Family Planning Work and Strictly Controlling Population
Growth" entrusted senior party officials at each level with responsibility for
supervising birth control in regions under their administration. According to
the new "family-planning target management responsibility contracts" (jihua
shengyu mubiao guanli zerenzhi)5' announced in this Decision, the
performance of party leaders and government officials is assessed on the basis
of their "achievement" of the allocated birth quotas for their areas. Failure to
keep the number of births within the quota could mean demotion, stiff fines,
or the loss of bonuses.
5 2
These measures for implementing the "one-birth" policy are integral parts
of China's national birth control campaign. The implementation tools are not
simply improvised by local officials.5" On the contrary, local enforcement
officials are carrying out a national policy and risk punishment if they fail to
do so. If some have pressed too zealously for compliance, it is largely because
of pressure from the center to achieve assigned quotas.
II. LEGAL DEFECTS AND POLICY INCOHESION
In Part I, I argued that discrimination and coercion are the results of state
family-planning policies, and not merely the result of corrupt, abusive, or
48. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 36-41.
49. Id.
50. For discussion of the fluctuating politics of enforcement, see Susan Greenhalgh & Jiali Li,
Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China: For a Feminist Demography of
Reproduction, 20 SIGNS 601 (1995). The authors identified three stages: 1979-83 (resistance to the policy,
especially in rural China); 1984-87 (negotiation between central and local authorities); and post-1988
(submission). Id. at 609.
51. Decision on Stepping Up Family Planning Work, supra note 18.
52. Id. at 912.
53. Some authors assume that the "policy" and its "implementation" operate independently. See, e.g.,
Lisa Gregory, Examining the Economic Component of China's One-Child Family Policy Under International
Law: Your Money or Your Life, 6 J. CHINESE L. 45, 46-47 (1992). According to a draft report by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Services, "the Chinese government and the U.S. Department of State have
indicated that the coercive elements of the family planning program are the result of the isolated excesses
of local officials in remote rural areas." China: Family Planning Policy and Practice in the People's
Republic of China, PROFILE SERIES (Resource Information Center of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service), July 1994, at 20. These claims are seriously challenged in this investigation.
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overzealous individual officials. In Part II.A, I discuss the fundamental defects
in the policy, analyzing the specific ways the policy operates to coerce and
discriminate. In Part II.B, in an effort to explain the government's failure to
protect women and children, I analyze the conflicts between family planning
and other government policies, the intensified social pressure to defy family-
planning policy, and the dynamics of resistance and reinforced state coercion.
Incoherence in the state policy has exacerbated clashes between tradition and
the birth-control policy and has evoked social violence against women and
children.
There are three aspects of the link between state policies and coercive
measures used against women and children. First, discriminatory and/or
coercive methods are straightforwardly prescribed in provincial family-planning
regulations. Considering the center's strong effort to control the provinces, it
is implausible that these regulations are hidden from, or enforced in defiance
of, the central authorities. Rather, as I argue later in Part II.A, coercive
measures found in provincial regulations have been adopted under considerable
pressure from the central authorities.
Second, there is a lack of specific statutes to punish government officials
or others acting in an official capacity who abuse the rights of women and
girls. Because of the lack of specific penalties and prosecution procedures in
the policy and in related laws such as the LPWRI and MIHCL, local officials
are free to use violence, especially when they are under a great deal of
pressure to achieve the rigidly assigned quota. For example, family-planning
regulations require that in cases of pregnancies in default of the plan,
"measures must be taken to terminate them."" 4 None of the provincial
regulations or policy directives specifically forbids forced late abortion, nor
have any of them set forth the penalties for punishing those officials who used
coercion to force pregnancy termination.
One could argue that the absence of statutes specifically addressing some
of the offenses that arise from the coercive family-planning policy is neither
a problem with the policy itself nor with the laws such as LPWRI and MIHCL.
The statutes on homicide in the criminal code could be applied to cases of
female infanticide, and the statutes on assault could be applied to physical
coercion of women who have unauthorized pregnancies. In reality, however,
as I argue in the following discussions, there is a great deal of prosecutorial
laxness in applying the criminal code toward offenses related to the family-
planning policy.
This brings us to the third link between state policies and coercive
measures against women. Even where penalties are legislated, there is a lack
of enforcement. Prosecutions of local officials who authorized or took no
54. See, e.g., Hunan Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 25. In Hebei province, the
government made it clear that "all out-of-plan pregnancies must undergo abortion or induced abortion."
Hebei Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 18.
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action to prevent violence against women in family planning have rarely taken
place, according to interviews with Chinese lawyers, family-planning officials,
and international human rights monitors.55 When the government decides to
crack down on certain crimes, as it has done recently in cases of drug
trafficking and corruption, state legal agencies swiftly arrest and prosecute
large numbers of offenders, prominently publicize their efforts, and display
the offenders in public in order to make examples of them to others.56 To
family-planning enforcement officials, governmental silence and lax
enforcement are clear signals that they may use force with virtual impunity
while implementing family-planning policies.
A. Defects in the Law
1. Legalized Discrimination and Violence
China's birth-control regulations and relevant laws have permitted
discrimination and violence against women and children. In some cases the
permission has been explicit; in others it has been implicit. The following
examples illustrate the various forms of legalized discrimination and violence
under the family-planning policy.
a. Discrimination Against Children
Central government policies and provincial regulations impose stiff
penalties for violations of the family-planning policy. These penalties often
target out-of-plan children. According to most provincial regulations, children
born out-of-plan are not entitled to state subsidies, admission to public day care
and schools, and access to public health care.57 When couples have out-of-
plan children, they invalidate the benefits for their first, "planned" child and
have to pay back the benefits that they have enjoyed. The same penalties apply
to people who adopt these children without permission.58 These regulations
also punish parents with stiff fines, salary reductions, or loss of employment,
thus weakening parents' ability to provide for their children's nutrition, health
and education.59
55. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1. It is possible that there have
been some cases of prosecution, but, as a consistent practice in China, the official press tends not to expose
the so-called "dark side" in order to save face and to avoid demoralizing government officials.
56. For documentation of speedy prosecutions, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: No ONE IS
SAFE-POLITICAL REPRESSION AND ABUSE OF POWER IN THE 1990S 14-20, 85-97 (1996).
57. See, e.g., Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 22, 1, 25, 27, 28; Shandong
Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, arts. 29, 32; Anhui Sheng Jihua Shenyu Tiaoli [Anhui Family
Planning Regulations], (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh Anhui People's Congress, Oct.
31, 1988), art. 22, 1989 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN ILAW YEAR BOOK OF CHINA] 397, 399; Hebei Family
Planning Regulations, supra note 27, arts. 27, 28.
58. See id. art. 24; Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 29, 1 4.
59. On the other hand, the policy offers attractive economic incentives to couples if they make the
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Children born into poor families are particularly vulnerable under this
policy. Recent government directives and provincial regulations have banned
any assistance to poor families who violate the birth policy, no matter how dire
the family's circumstances. As one such regulation states: "Couples who
violate this regulation and give birth to extra-quota babies . . . and run into
subsistence difficulties should not be subsidized nor provided with welfare."'"
A 1989 State Council's Order conditioned entitlement to the state's poverty
aid in several poor regions upon the regions' birth control achievements."'
It cautioned that the government's financial, technological, and other state
assistance to poor regions should not be used to stimulate fertility. The
following terms were imposed:
(1) Poor families that practice birth control should have a priority in
getting loans, having access to farming material supply, and entering
technology training programs. They should have better opportunity for
employment or for selling their products [to the state].62
(2) Families that have difficulties with basic needs for food and clothing 3
should be persuaded to postpone having their second child, even if they
qualify for having a second."
(3) Such poor families with out-of-plan children should not be given any
"poverty assistance" until they take effective contraceptive measures. All
preferential assistance to them should be suspended. If they are already
beneficiaries of "poverty assistance" programs, their participation is
terminated and they must pay fines for violating the birth quota. 5
Because children continue to be born "out-of-plan," these regulations
contribute to their neglect and deprivation. By enforcing such penalties, the
government breaks its promise to ensure adequate nutrition, health care, and
"one birth" pledges. Such incentives often include free health care, day care and education, food and cash
subsidies. In rural areas, couples with only one child are sometimes awarded fivorable land contracts. See
Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 29, 2; Shanxi Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 33, art. 30, 1; Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, arts. 22,
11-2, 24, 25.
60. See Hunan Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 43.
61. Guowuyuan Bungonytin Zuanfa Guojia Jihuashenyu Weiyuanhui, Pingkundiqu Kaifa Lingdaoxio-
zhu Guanyu Fupinggongzhuo yu Jihuashenyu Gongzhuo Xiangjiehe Baogao de Tongzhi [The State Council
Notification Introducing the Report on Combining Poverty Assistance Work with Family Planning Work]
(adopted 1989), ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU FAGUI Qu ANSHU [THE COMPLETE BOOK OF
LAWS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS OF THE P.R.C.], 910-911 [hereinafter State Council Notification]
(requiring that state aid be halted if family planning regulations are intentionally violated).
62. Id. at 911.
63. A State Council Notification on poverty assistance estimated that, by the end of 1988, 40% of
those entitled to aid under the Notification were without adequate food or clothing. See State Council
Notification, supra note 61, at 910. The government estimated that, by the end of 1994, 70 million people
in rural China were living in poverty. INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PRC, THE
PROGRESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (1995), reprinted in Hunan Rights Issue Explored, CHINA DAILY,
Dec. 28, 1995, at A2 [hereinafter 1995 WHITE PAPER].




education for children, as provided by Chinese law" and the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child,67 which China has ratified.68 In fact,
the government penalizes these children for being born and for their parents'
violations of governmental policies by withdrawing these children's and their
siblings' entitlement to basic care.
b. Discrimination Against Female Children
The family-planning policy sometimes allows a second child in cases where
the first child is female. Such policies may be motivated by efforts to be
sensitive to the arguably unintended consequences (such as female infanticide)
of the rigid birth control policy. The stipulation that couples with a girl can,
under certain conditions, have a second child shows some flexibility. Its
adoption may be intended to help reduce the ill-treatment of female children.
In the 1980s, in rural areas, forced compliance with the birth control policy
had resulted in a rise in the rate of incidents of female infanticide and
abandonment of girls, with five percent of female infants disappearing from
the records in national surveys. 69 In response to this return of traditional
practices, many provincial governments made room to allow couples to have
a second child if their first was a girl, so that they did not have to hide,
abandon, or kill their daughters in an attempt to try again, legally, for a son.
Policies that allow for a second child after a daughter sometimes impose
additional conditions. For instance, in Shandong, one parent must also either
have been a mining worker for five consecutive years, or have become
disabled.7' In Tianjin, the couple must also reside in a rural mountain area
with a shortage of laborers. 7 In some minority autonomous regions, couples
with one female child can have another birth without strings attached.' By
1989, eighteen provinces had legitimized this so-called "one-daughter family"
(dunuhu) policy. '
This effort, however, does not address the root problems of abuse of
female children. One cause is the birth-control policy's conflict with rural
economic reform policies, which creates pressure for rural families to prefer
66. See MIHCL, supra note 25; LPWRI, supra note 24; infra Part IlI.B.
67. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 24, U.N. Doc. A1441736, 28 I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter Children's
Conventionl.
68. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
69. See Sharon K. Horn, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts
Towards An(orher) Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 256-57 nn.26 & 28-29 (1992) (stating
5% of all infant girls in the Chinese population are unaccounted for).
70. See Shandong Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 7, 1 5, 7.
71. See Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 8, 1 4.
72. Guangxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 10, 11.
73. See, e.g., Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 1I, 4 1-4; Anhui Family
Planning Regulations, supra note 57, art. 5, 1 3, 13; Hebei Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27,
art. 14, 8-9. For a discussion of "one-daughter family" policy, see Zeng Yi, Is the Chinese Family
Planning Program "IIghtening p?', 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 333, at 335 (1989).
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male children.74 Instead, this "dunuhu" policy takes the seemingly expedient
approach to female child abuses without considering its grave social
consequences, i.e., perpetuating social discrimination against baby girls. In
fact, this policy gives official legitimization to sex discrimination by codifying
it into governmental birth regulations. It sends the public the message that
exceptions to the restriction on birth rates are permitted if the survival of male
lineage in the family is endangered.75 This policy makes the sex of the first
child the key factor in determining the number of births to be permitted per
couple. A female first-born seems a less-than-whole baby and needs to be
supplemented by a second child in order to count as much as one male first-
born.76
Many commentators blame the "backward" traditions among the masses
for sexist attitudes toward female children,' which have undeniably
contributed to the cruel practices against baby girls long before the family-
planning policy was adopted. The "dunuhu" policy, however, perpetuates such
sexist biases and signals to the "backward" masses that it is acceptable and
legal to continue the traditional practice of treating female children as less
valuable. Alternative ways of dealing with the problems by addressing their
root causes are discussed in the Conclusion.
c. Legalized Eugenics
Since the early 1980s, national and provincial governments have enacted
eugenics laws that authorize coercion. In 1986, the Ministry of Health
promulgated guidelines for the regulation of marriage and childbearing.78 The
guidelines prohibit people with hereditary diseases or family histories of mental
illness or retardation from having children.7" They also require the abortion
74. See infra Part II.B.1.
75. For example, in Shandong, a couple can have a second child if the husband and wife are both
rural residents and the husband is the only one who can have children among all his brothers. See Shandong
Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 8, 2.
76. See Ann D. Jordan, Women's Rights in the People's Republic of China: Patriarchal Wine Poured
From a Socialist Bottle, 8 J. CHINESE L. 47, 92-95 (1994)
77. Many scholars in the People's Republic of China have blamed cultural traditions for the return
of practices such as infanticide and the abandonment of infant girls. See Mu Guanzong, Jingnianlai
Zhongguo Chusheng Xingbiebi Shengao Piangao Xianxiang de Lilun Jieshi [A Theoretical Explanation of
Recent Rise in Sex Ratio at Birth in China] 1 RENKE YU JINGI [POPULATION & ECONOMICS] at 50 (1995)
(discussing the "strong preference for sons" at the core of "a culture of Chinese traditional reproduction");
see also Li Yongping, Yiner Xingbiebi Jiqihe Shehui Jingjibianliang de Guanxi: Pucha de Jieguo he
Shuofanyin de Xianshi [Infant Sex Ratio and Its Relationship with Socio-economic Variables: Results of
Population Census and the Reflected Realties], 4 RENKE YU JINGI [POPULATION & EcoNoMics] at 3, 6,
12-13 (1993) (discussing how traditional preference for male children affects treatmentof baby girls); Wang
Xiaoyan, Zhongguo Chuantongwenhua yu Zhongguo Dute de Shenyuguan [Chinese Traditional Culture
and China's Unique Idea of Reproduction] (1994) (arguing Chinese historic culture poses severe constraints
on people's views of reproductive ethics) (abstract of unpublished paper on file with author).
78. Yichang Qingkuang de Fenlei Zhidao Biaozhun [Guiding Criteria for Classification of Abnormal
Cases], Ministry of Health (released July 21, 1986), reprinted in CHINESE WOMEN LAW BOOK 669 (All
China Women's Federation ed., 1993) [hereinafter Guiding Criteria for Abnormal Cases].
79. Id. at 669-70.
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of fetuses in some cases where parents fail genetic screening tests." The new
MIHCL made this policy a national law. Such legislation is, in fact, part of
the family-planning campaign, one of the stated goals of which is the
improvement of the "quality" of the Chinese population. 8 These eugenic
measures add to the legitimization of forced abortion and sterilization measures
against certain categories of people.
The Ministry of Health's draft "Guiding Criteria for Classification of
Abnormal Cases" listed four categories of persons who are permitted to marry
but not permitted to have children. These include couples in which both
spouses are "born deaf-mute due to a hereditary disease or disorder,"82 or
in which at least one spouse has hereditary "schizophrenia, manic depression,
or heart disease."83
The provincial family-planning regulations contain similar language. In
Shandong Province, for instance, "[tihose who have been found to have the
possibility to give birth to severely defective babies or babies with severe
hereditary diseases . . . should be banned from having children; if pregnant,
the pregnancy should be terminated."" In Shanxi, "[i]f one spouse is insane
(cli), an idiot (dai), or a fool (sha), or has any other hereditary disease likely
to cause severe defects in descendants, that spouse should be sterilized."5
Jilin" and Gansu87 have similar regulations.
Responding to criticism, the government tried in the recently enacted
MIHCL to change the rules governing mandatory sterilization. Yet even with
these changes, people with serious hereditary diseases, "legal [or legally
80. Id. at 770.
81. Anyone familiar with the Chinese language might point out that the Chinese name for this policy
is better translated as "superior (or optimum) birth and upbringing" (you sheng you yu). It could well be
a policy promoting quality prenatal, maternal and infant care. In this sense the translation should not be
"eugenics" in the sense of biological engineering to select "superior" genes. However, implementation
measures have included provisions legalizing eugenics measures. See supra notes 78-80, infra notes 82-87
and accompanying text.
82. Guiding Criteria for Abnormal Cases, supra note 78, at 669.
83. Id.
84. Shandong Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 17. Similar language is found in Hunan
Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 23; Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations, supra
note 39, art. 12; Guangxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 16; Gansu Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 35, art. 16; Shanxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 13.
85. Shanxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 13.
86. Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 15.
87. Gansu has the most comprehensive eugenics regulation, which prohibits "chi dai sha" persons
(defined as those whose conditions are hereditary, whose IQ is below 49, and who face language, memory,
orientation, thinking, and other behavioral obstacles) from marrying until they undergo sterilization.
Gansusheng Renda Changweihui Guanyu Jingzhi Chi dai Sha-Renshang yu de Guiding [The Regulation
Banning chi dai sha Persons from Giving Birth], art. 2, (adopted by the 5th Sess. of the Standing Comm.
of People's Cong. in Gansu Province on Nov. 23, 1988) in 1989 ZHONGGUo FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR
BOOK OF CHINA] 469. If a pregnancy occurs, it must be terminated and the woman must be sterilized. Id.
art. 5. According to officials, most of the province's 260,000 retarded people have been sterilized since
this regulation came into effect. Nick Ruffords, China Moves To Ban Babies with Defects, THE SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Feb. 5, 1995. The number of sterilizations between January 1989 and June 1991 alone
in Gansu was given as 6,271. Chiang Fu-mei, Some 6,000 Child-Bearing Retarded Adults Undergo
Sterilization Operation in Gansu, MING PAO, Jan. 31, 1992, reprinted in FBIS-CHI-92-029, Feb. 12, 1992,
at 48.
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defined] contagious disease[s]," or "relevant mental disorder[s]," are told to
"postpone their marriage"88 and, if either partner has "a serious hereditary
disease, . . . the couple may marry if they agree to take long-lasting
contraceptive measures or give up child bearing by undergoing ligation."89
While this law stipulates that ligation or the termination of a pregnancy has
to be consented to by the pregnant woman (or, if she is "legally incompetent,"
by her guardian), 9° serious doubt remains that this gives a woman much
protection in practice. The tremendous pressures involved in the family-
planning campaign, as discussed above,9' make it very difficult for women
not to "agree" to an abortion or sterilization.
Provincial regulations and an earlier draft of the MIHCL (originally called
the Eugenics Law) created an uproar both in China and abroad. 92 Some
Chinese health and genetic biology experts are concerned that these provisions
are based on assumptions lacking a sound scientific basis.9" In fact, these
measures may have been motivated more by the governmental drive for low
birth rates than by science. The world scientific community long ago rejected
the assumptions upon which the Chinese eugenics policy was partially
based-that mentally disabled individuals will beget children with the same
disabilities." The current scientific understanding is that genetic diagnosis
can, at its best, help to predict the likelihood of certain diseases in a fetus.
Furthermore, the World Medical Association requires physicians to "maintain
the utmost respect for human life from its beginning even under threat" and
not to use their medical knowledge "contrary to the laws of humanity."9'
d. Forced Abortion and Infanticide
The Chinese government is implicated in violence and discrimination
against women and children through the enforcement of state policies and legal
provisions that implicitly grant permission to use violent measures. As shown
above in Part I, the threat of administrative penalties exerts a great deal of
88. See MIHCL, supra note 25, art. 9.
89. Id. art. 10.
90. MIHCL, supra note 25, art. 19.
91. See supra Part I.C.
92. Ruth Youngblood, China Law Defers Disabled Marriages, UPI, Oct. 27, 1994 (noting that the
MIHCL was originally called the "Eugenics Law" when submitted to the National People's Congress in
December 1993, but was renamed "to placate fierce criticism from Western countries").
93. Officials at the State Family Planning Commission and the Gansu Family Planning Commission
reportedly lobbied the central government to repeal the Gansu Province regulation. Interview with a family
planning official, in New York, N.Y. [neither the official's identity, nor the date of the official's visit to
New York can be revealed in order to protect the official's safety] (notes on file with author).
94. This policy, though, may also be based on the assumption that disabled parents cannot care
properly for their offspring.
95. Passage of Discriminatory Eugenics Law, AM. ASs'N. ADVANCEMENT Scl. HUM. RTs. ACTION
NETWORK (Science & Human Rights Program, American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, Wash.
D.C.), Apr. 14, 1995, at 2 (quoting Declaration of Geneva, adopted by World Medical Association in 1948)
(on file with author).
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pressure on couples to control birth and terminate unauthorized pregnancies.
Under such pressures, women often find they have no choice but to undergo
sterilization or abortion,9 even when the pregnancy is well-advanced.97 For
example, the Jilin Family Planning Regulation mandates that "all out-of-plan
pregnancies caused by failures of contraceptives should be terminated,"98 but
no stipulation of any specific gestational period is given beyond which the
performance of such terminations is prohibited. Since no restriction on
gestational period is imposed and the goal is to achieve the targeted birth
quota, family-planning officials are obligated and motivated to track down
women with "out-of-plan" pregnancies and make sure that they have abortions,
regardless of how far their pregnancies have advanced.
When fetuses survive forced late abortions, they are sometimes promptly
suffocated to death with sheets by health workers." Though regulations do
not explicitly urge doctors to perform this practice, neither do they prohibit
them from doing so. Doctors or nurses who let these babies live without
permission from family-planning authorities are in principle punishable for
"malpractice," "refusing to carry out family-planning policy," or for
"interfering with family-planning officials in the performance of their
duties.""10 Unlike the better-known practice of female infanticide1", by
families, the killing of fetuses who survive late-term induced abortion is not
the result of parental decisions, but is the result of enforcement by authorities
who supervise abortions of "illegal" pregnancies. Such killings are carried out
virtually under official order and are often overseen by family-planning
officials.
Family-planning officials, in turn, are under pressure to carry out the
policy. As discussed in Part I.C., the birth control policy penalizes those
officials who fail to achieve quotas and attempt to circumvent the policy.
According to a central government legal directive, anyone who forges a "birth
96. In some regions, if a woman manages to go into hiding to avoid forced abortion, her family and
those who provide her with hiding places face heavy fines. In Anhui Province, the regulation specifies that
such a fine is between 300 and 500 yuan. Anhui Family Planning Regulations, supra note 57, arts. 22,
1 3, 23. In Hunan, it is 400 to 800 yuan. The same fine also applies to parents of babies born out of
wedlock. Hunan Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 30.
97. A journalist who was permitted to accompany a government "task force" rounding up women for
forced abortion and sterilization reported that some of the women crowded into the county hospital awaiting
abortions were more than six months pregnant. Liu Yin, China's Wanted Children, THE INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 11, 1991, at 25. Chi An, a woman who was trained as an abortionist in China in the early 1980s,
reports that her training program included assisting doctors in performing forced late-term abortions.
STEVEN W. MOSHER, A MOTHER'S ORDEAL 254 (1993). The ethics of forcing women to undergo abortions
in the late stages of pregnancy, however, are not uncontroversial. See Li Benfu, An Ethical Analysis on
41 Cases of Abortion Undergone by Pregnants with 28 Weeks and Its Countermeasures (1994) (abstract
of unpublished paper on file with author) (Li, Professor of Medicine at Beijing Medical University,
concludes doctors should not perform involuntary late-term abortions).
98. See Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 18.
99. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1. at 51.
100. See Hebei Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 32. See also Gansu Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 35, art. 44, and Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 35.
101. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
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permission certificate" or issues "illegal" birth certificates that legitimize out-
of-plan births is punishable under the P.R.C. Criminal Law.' 2 Also, under
the aforementioned "family-planning target management responsibility
contracts," 0 3 officials face stiff fines, demotion, or dismissal if the birth
quota for the areas for which they are responsible is not achieved.
The mandatory birth quota and its accompanying legal penalties pressure
family-planning officials into using all means at their disposal, including
coercive means, to ensure the fulfillment of birth quotas. Some rural officials
even mobilize local militia (minbing)" or request assistance from county
police to hunt down women who have not voluntarily undergone abortion or
sterilization as required by the regulations. The armed men, accompanied by
family-planning officials, deliver these women to the clinics. In instances
documented in different parts of the country, these men have surrounded the
homes of women who went into hiding, beating up their husbands, confiscating
their furniture and destroying their houses."0 5
2. Lack of Implementation Mechanisms
This section examines situations where the family-planning policy and
relevant legislation provide for the protection of the rights and interests of
women and children but then fail to specify necessary mechanisms for
implementation. The policy has been mostly directed toward penalizing those
who evade birth control restrictions or interfere with or obstruct family-
planning officials' work. However, it is virtually silent on punishing violations
by government officials of women's and children's rights and interests.
a. No Penalties for Officials who Violate Women's and Girls' Human
Rights
Centrally-enacted laws, such as the LPWRI and MIHCL, prohibit violence
against women and baby girls. As LPWRI states, "Discriminating against,
abusing, or injuring women is prohibited."" °6 And "Women's rights to life
and health brook no infringement."107 The LPWRI is more detailed and
102. Zhuigao Renmin Fayuan Zhuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Yifa Yiancheng Puohuai Jihua
Shengyu Fangzuihuodong de Tongzhi [Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate
Notification on Severe Legal Punishmentof Criminal ActivitiesSabotaging Family Planning] (adopted 1993)
[hereinafter Notification on Sabotaging Family Planning], in 1 JIANCHAYUAN BAOGAO [PROCURATORATE
REPORT) at 13-14 (1994).
103. Decision on Stepping Up Family Planning Work, supra note 18.
104. Local militiamen are able-bodied volunteers, often veterans or locally trained young activists,
who are paid by the authorities to carry out special tasks such as keeping public order and assisting family
planning in the communities.
105. See WOMEN IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 25; CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE,
supra note 1, at 39.
106. See LPWRI, supra note 24, art. 2.
107. Id. art. 35.
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specific in comparison to previous legislation protecting women's rights, such
as the Marriage Law. It has provisions against crimes that have not been
seriously dealt with previously in Chinese laws, such as the crimes "to drown,
forsake, or cruelly injure or kill baby girls," "to discriminate against or abuse
women who give birth to baby girls or bear no children" and "to cruelly injure
or kill women by superstitious or violent means."108
These practices are also officially prohibited by provincial family-planning
regulations. "[T]he killing, abandoning, [and] abuse of female babies and their
mothers" is prohibited, and "violations should be punished by administrative
measures, and where criminal law applies, legal measures should be
sought. "109
While these laws should apply to all such violations, including those
committed while purportedly carrying out the family-planning policy, no
specific penalties for violations by officials acting in a governmental capacity
to enforce policies are stipulated in either the LPWRI or MIHCL."° Instead,
these laws and some provincial regulations claim that the Administrative
Procedures Law and the Criminal Law provide a legal basis for individual
citizens to seek redress against local family-planning authorities who go beyond
the regulations in implementing birth control.11 ' But little actual protection
is offered under these laws. For example, articles 2 and 35 of LPWRI simply
list certain practices as "prohibited" in society without specifying how
violations by officials will be punished and what penalties will be meted out.
When the LPWRI makes specific references to the P.R.C. Criminal Law and
the Security and Administration Punishment Act, it does not render directly
punishable officials who use violence against women. For example, the LPWRI
was appended with a list of penalties from the Criminal Law that the
lawmakers recommended as applicable to and adequate for punishing crimes
of violence against women and girls. Authorities have thus been able to refer
to this appendix as proof that violence against women by officials in connection
with family planning is addressed by P.R.C. Criminal Law. But on this
appended list, the only article that speaks of punishing state agents says that
"state personnel who abuse their powers and use public office for private
gain-carrying out retaliation or frame-ups against those making complaints,
petitions, or criticisms-are to be sentenced to not more than two years of
108. Id.
109. Shandong Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 34. See also Hebei Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 27, art. 32, 1 3-4; Anhui Family Planning Regulations, supra note 57, art. 27,
1. The Criminal Law of the P.R.C. considers intentional killing a crime. Zhonquo Renmin Gongheguo
Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted 1979), art. 132, available in LEXIS,
INTLAW Library, CHINAL File [hereinafter Criminal Law]. Additionally, the Constitution prohibits
maltreatment of children. See XIANFA [Constitution] art. 49, 1 4 (1982).
110. For an analysis of this problem, see Jonathan Hecht, The Legal Protection of Women's Rights
in China: Discretionary Enforcement of Human Rights Norms, CHINA RIGHTs FORuM 4 (Fall 1995).
111. This claim was made, for example, in the LPWRI, supra note 24; in Hebei Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 27, art. 32; Anhui Family Planning Regulations, supra note 57, art. 27; Shandong
Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 35.
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fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention; when the circumstances are
serious, the sentence is to be not less than two years and not more than seven
years of fixed-term imprisonment." ll2 Officials are punishable under this law
only if they retaliate against those who file complaints for their abuses. There
is no mention of whether officials who are abusive or use violence will be
prosecuted independently of the victim filing a complaint and suffering
reprisals as a consequence. In other words, if women do not themselves file
complaints of being taken away or detained, of their husbands being beaten
up or of their houses being demolished, then the officials who violate the
LPWRI are unlikely to be penalized.
If "cruel injury and killing" by government officials were systematically
handled under criminal codes governing assault and murder cases, there should
be no need for specific laws relating to violence by officials. But the LPWRI's
failure to specify penalties for abusive officials implies that abusive officials
will not be subjected to criminal laws and may evade responsibility for their
offenses. Enforcement of specific state policies such as family planning often
take priority over the law. In this sense, the LPWRI's failure to provide
penalties for the use of violence by officials means that its promise to punish
violence against women is an empty one."'
b. The Disappearance of Baby Girls
Due to the lack of terms of punishment, the LPWRI, MIHCL and
provincial regulations may thus have little impact on checking the use of
violence in the birth control campaign. The violence has taken a particularly
heavy toll among female infants. One useful indicator of female infants' plight
in recent years is the skewed sex ratio at birth" 4 and the disappearance of
millions of baby girls.' These demographic results are most likely due to
the resurgence of traditional practices such as female infanticide," 6 sex-
112. Criminal Law, supra note 109, art.146. See Appendix: Relevant Articles of Laws to LPWRI,
supra note 24.
113. For a discussion of how LPWRI provides individual women with little opportunity to take legal
action to protect their rights, see Hecht, supra note 110, at 4-6, 13.
114. The 1990 census data, which examined 10% of the population, put the ratio at birth at 111.4
boys born to every 100 girls born. The world average is 105 or 106. Li Yongping, supra note 77, at 3.
The sex ratio at birth in Zaozhuang city, Shandong Province, during the first half of 1993 reached 144.6
boys to 100 girls, and in Tengzhou city of the same province, the ratio during the same period was 163.8.
Mu Guangzong, supra note 77, at 50.
115. Terence H. Hull calculated that, for the year 1986 alone, over half a million female births were
missing. Hull, Recent Trends in Sex Ratios at Birth in China, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 67 (1990).
116. One fact supporting the suspicion that female infanticide might not just be a rare phenomenon
is that the large discrepancy between male and female babies cannot be squarely explained by the number
of female fetuses aborted and the number of girls concealed from census workers. These girls have not
resurfaced in subsequent surveys of older age-group children. If they had been in hiding, local officials
would sometimes have allowed them to get registered after a few years of being "underground." But it
is also possible that these "disappeared" girls may have made their way into orphanages and adopted
families because the number of female orphans and adopted female children has seemed to increase. Exact
calculation, however, is not possible due to lack of accurate data.
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selective abortion, and abandonment and concealment" 7 of female babies,
combined with under-reporting of female births and the offering of female
babies for adoption.
Because laws and provincial regulations lack specific penalties and
enforcement procedures, those who commit female infanticide," 8 sex-specific
abortion, or abandonment of baby girls run very little risk of actually being
caught and prosecuted. For instance, the Tianjin Regulation stipulated that
those guilty of "abandoning, cruelly killing or hurting infants" or "abusing
female infants and their mothers" were "to be given administrative discipline
by their working unit; if [their action] violates the P.R.C. Security and
Administration Punishment Act, they are given administrative penalties by
public security agencies; if [their action] constitutes crime, the judiciary system
should seek legal responsibility according to the law. ""' However, it was
left to the working units to decide what "administrative discipline" should be
given, and, as discussed above, existing laws are inadequate to punish criminal
acts against baby girls.
Under China's current legal system, the government has generally failed
to act against crimes unless the victim presses charges. The victim has to be
persistent in suing and bringing charges against the defendants. In "minor"
cases of assault and injury, the victim must initiate a private prosecution. If
she is persistent and successful in getting the court's attention, her abuser
might be punished. 20 Abandoned, abused or neglected infants and children
are extremely unlikely to press for suits to be brought. 2 '
The Criminal Law provides for light sentences of up to two years even
when the crime is "odious," and up to seven years when it results in "serious
injury or death."12 Even in "odious" cases, if the victim withdraws her suit,
117. Some baby girls may have been born and are still alive, but their parents have concealed them
from official registration, national surveys, and/or local authorities, in order to be able to have, legally,
male children. In rural areas where residents may live far apart it is not difficult to "hide" little children.
In addition, sympathetic fellow villagers and even local officials (who are often relatives of those who want
to have more children or are afraid of rich village elites) tend to either assist with or ignore such
concealment. The recent internal migration, which created a floating population, also makes concealment
of children much easier than in the past.
118. For a discussion of female infanticide in China, see Hom, supra note 69 at 255, n.20 (referring
to female infanticide as "the induced death (euthanasia) of infants by suffocation, drowning, abandonment,
exposure, or other methods"). See also Nicholas D. Kristof, A Mysteryfrom China's Census: Where Have
Young Girls Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1991, at Al; Surge in Girt Baby-Killing, CHI. TRm., Feb. 22,
1990, at C19.
119. Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 39, art. 30. Similar stipulation is also found
in Hunan Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 45 (where "the sale and purchase" of baby girls
is also listed as a crime); Shandong Family Planning Regulations, supra note 30, art. 34; Hebei Family
Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 32.
120. For instance, a court in Liaoning Province declined to prosecute a man who had beaten his wife
and broken her eardrum. The court ruled that the wife had to bring the case herself. Jordan, supra note
76, at 91.
121. Jordan notes that, although a civil suit could be brought under the LPWRI, there is no one who
would sue since the only persons who have a legal standing to sue are the victims and their families, who
"are either dead (the infants) or the perpetrators (the parents)." Supra note 76, at 95.
122. Criminal Law, supra note 109, art. 182. For a discussion of how the Chinese legal system fails
to protect women, see Jordan, supra note 76, at 76-83, 90-96. See also Paul D. McKenzie, China and the
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generally the case will not proceed. The defendants in most cases of infanticide
and abandonment are the parents or relatives of infants. The existing law tends
to penalize with relative leniency those who harm family members, including
those guilty of female infanticide or abandoning baby girls. For example, the
Security and Administration Punishment Act requires the following:
Violations of such personal rights as beating other people and causing
minor injuries, maltreating family members, or illegally restricting
other people's personal freedom are subject to 15 days or less of
detention, or a fine of 200 yuan or less, or a warning if the violation
is not serious enough for criminal punishment."2
Article 182 of the Criminal Code specifies a sentence of only two years or less
to those who commit particularly "odious" physical abuse of family
members. 24 In comparison, strangers (i.e., non-family members) who
commit such crimes are given much heavier penalties."2
The LPWRI continues to let the punishment be handled by the existing
criminal laws, which are largely inadequate for protecting women and infant
girls. Because the LPWRI fails to provide for enforcement mechanisms, the
only remedies available are those provided by ineffectual legislation adopted
before the LPWRI. These legislative omissions in the LPWRI in part explain
why very few cases of female infanticide and abandonment have been
prosecuted. The recent rise of these practices is thus not attributable simply
to the backwardness of peasants who are said to cling to traditional feudal
values. 26 Female infanticide, as one legal scholar writes, "must be
reconceptualized as more than a privatized prohibited social practice whose
causes stem from the remnants of feudalism. The killing of girl-infants is a
form of violence against the infant herself, the mother, and all women in the
society in which the practice occurs."
127
Women's Convention: Prospects for the Implementation of an International Norm, 7 CHINA L. REP. 23
(1991) (discussing absence of effective enforcement and independent judiciary in China and how it
contributes to failures in women's rights protection); Hecht, supra note 110.
123. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegou Zhian Guanli Chufa Tiaoli [P.R.C. Security and Administration
Punishment Act] (adopted 1986), art. 22, in 1987 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIN [LAW YEAR BOOK OF CHINA]
90.
124. Criminal Law, supra note 109, art. 182.
125. See Jordan, supra note 76, at 91 (noting that penalties for beating women depend on whether
the assailant is her husband or a stranger).
126. See supra note 77.
127. Horn, supra note 69, at 258.
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3. Lack of Law Enforcement
As noted above, the rights and interests of women and children are
supposed to be protected under the LPWRI, the MIHCL, and the various
family-planning regulations. In addition to inadequate implementation
mechanisms, however, the failure to use available mechanisms when they do
exist leaves women and children vulnerable to discrimination and violence in
family-planning campaigns. When such violations occur, legal instruments have
rarely been utilized to render punishment or remedies. There may have been
isolated cases of prosecutions, but they have not been publicized, perhaps for
the following reason: by rarely pressing prosecutions of officials who abuse
power, the government may wish to avoid harming the morale of family-
planning workers and discouraging their efforts to achieve the birth-rate
targets. Also, central control over the increasingly autonomous local officials
has diminished with the implementation of market reforms.
a. Sex-Selective Abortion of Female Fetuses
Existing law for prosecuting this crime has rarely been enforced. The
practice of prenatal sex identification, which has led to the abortion of many
female fetuses, is almost a routine practice in cities and towns where
ultrasound technology is available, though officially declared illegal. 2 ' The
availability of ultrasound, together with the ease of obtaining abortion on
demand, makes it almost irresistible for couples who prefer sons to take the
test to determine the sex of their babies and abort female fetuses. 29
Officials do not deny the pervasiveness of this practice and have passed
legislation to ban it and penalize violations. 3 ' Provincial regulations have
also prohibited the use of ultrasound technology for the purpose of sex
selection.' The new MIHCL stipulates that "[i]dentification of the sex of a
fetus through technological means is strictly forbidden unless it is necessary
on medical grounds. " 132 When certified doctors "perform the identification
of a fetus's sex," "administrative punishment" should be meted out and "the
128. Three existing technologies can be used to determine the sex of a fetus: amniocentesis, chorionic
biopsy, and ultrasound. Amniocentesis and chorionic biopsy are still not easily obtainable in small cities
and towns, but have become available in major municipal, provincial, and army hospitals. Ultrasound,
however, can be administered in most hospitals, even those at the county level. The first ultrasound
machines were manufactured in China in 1979, and by 1987 about 13,000 machines were used in Chinese
hospitals, averaging six per county. Mu Guangzong, supra note 112, at 50, n. 1.
129. According to Chinese officials, ultrasound was used in 2,316 cases in one county to determine
the sex of the fetus, resulting in abortions of 1,006 female fetuses. Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Turn to
Ultrasound, Scorning Baby Girls for Boys, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1993, at Al.
130. Notification on Sabotaging Family Planning, supra note 101, at 13.
131. See Tianjin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 29, art. 30, 2; Anhui Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 58, art. 27, 1 3; Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 26, art. 35, 3;
Guangxi Autonomous Region Family Planning Regulations, supra note 32, art. 31, 1 9; Hunan Family
Planning Regulations, supra note 29, art. 44, 1 4.
132. MIHCL, supra note 23, art. 32.
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person involved should be deprived of his operating qualification according
to the law."' 33
Because similarly worded provincial regulations have not been effectively
enforced, the MIHCL can be expected to have little deterrent effect on the
widespread use of sonograms for sex selection. The nearly nonexistent
prosecution and punishment rate for this offense indicates that law enforcement
officials are either unwilling or unable to enforce the law. A number of factors
have contributed to this laxness, including the widespread cooperation of
medical services providers, both for profit and as a service for family and
friends. Strict birth control measures and couples' strong desire for sons has
made the demand for sex-screening so overwhelming that screening has
become a profitable business. As the Ministry of Public Health admitted, "[t]o
make more money, some hospitals, including some individually run clinics,
are in the business of sex-forecasting."' 34 The growing market economy also
encourages trading in ultrasound scanning services.135 In addition, many
physicians secretly perform tests for relatives and friends. Virtually anyone
who has a personal connection to a physician or can offer money or gifts can
be served.
b. Abandonment of Baby Girls
This practice has flourished despite the presence of laws explicitly enacted
to prohibit "drown[ing], forsak[ing]," injuring, or killing baby girls.'36 Most
infants abandoned are female. Female orphans constitute the overwhelming
majority of children in ill-equipped orphanages throughout the country.'37
Child abandonment is an age-old practice in China, largely due to poverty or
out-of-wedlock birth, but the recent cases have also resulted in part from the
birth-control policy. Parents desperate for boys may have to try many times
in order to have their wish fulfilled. At the same time, they may fear
punishment for having more than the permitted number of children. They may
thus resort to female child abandonment. Unwanted daughters could have been
given up for adoption. But certain jurisdictions punish parents who give up
"out-of-plan" children for adoption or who adopt such children without special
permission. ' Some parents who are desperate for sons and who do not want
to kill their unwanted daughters thus leave them in bus or train stations or
outside orphanages.
133. MIHCL, supra note 23, art. 37.
134. See Stop Sex Checks of Fetuses, BElING REV., July 10-16, 1989, at 13.
135. At the current Chinese market rates, the initial cost of an ultrasound machine is approximately
$1,000. An owner can charge up to $50 per scan.
136. LPWRI, supra note 23, art. 35.
137. In the under-staffed and poorly facilitated state-run orphanages, these babies often die young or
live in poor mental and physical health. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, DEATH BY DEFAULT (1996)
(comprehensive study of conditions in China's orphanages).
138. See, e.g., Anhui Family Planning Regulations, supra note 58, art. 24.
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c. Deprivation of "Out-of-Plan" Children
Depriving out-of-plan children's basic care needs"3 9 is also a case of
failed law enforcement. Such penalties prescribed in the birth policy are
incompatible with stipulations in the new MIHCL. The new law pledges to
provide for the basic health needs of children, promising that "[the state
provides essential conditions and material assistance to the development of
undertakings for maternal and infant health care, so that mothers and infants
have access to medical and health care services.""4 Such legal provision is
not enforced because the state's policy priority dictates punishing parents for
having out-of-plan children by withholding these children's benefits and their
protection under MIHCL.
d. Medical Risks of Contraception, Abortion, and Sterilization
Family-planning regulations require those performing abortion or
sterilization to follow strict sanitary procedures in order to safeguard the health
of the patient. 4 These provisions are overlooked, however, when large
numbers of abortions and sterilizations are performed hastily for the sake of
meeting rigid quotas and deadlines. Particularly in poorly equipped rural
clinics, doctors perform procedures on women brought in from many villages
and cannot devote adequate attention to each case. Sometimes they only have
time to change gloves between operations and skip other sanitary precautions.
These unhygienic practices persist because only rarely are there any
disciplinary consequences for those who administer the operations. After
undergoing abortion or sterilization under medically unsafe conditions, women
are at risk of sequelae such as pelvic infections, extravasated blood in the
pelvis, and pelvic hematoma.'42
When women experience medical problems as a result of mandatory
operations, doctors are allowed to inform patients of their medical conditions
but cannot remove an implanted IUD upon a woman's request without
permission from officials. The unauthorized removal of an IUD is punishable
by administrative discipline or penalties and, in "severe cases," as a criminal
offense, 43 and such offenses, due to their threat to government policy, are
often swiftly punished. National legal and public security agencies issued joint
139. Supra Part I.C and Part II.A.l.a.
140. See MIHCL, supra note 23, art. 2.
141. See, e.g., Jilin Family Planning Regulations,supra note 26, art. 19 (requiring that "contraceptive
operations must be conducted under appropriate [safe] conditions and by qualified medical personnel
... to ensure the safety of patients who are operated on"); see also Shanxi Family Planning Regulation,
supra note 32, art. 16; Gansu Family Planning Regulations, supra note 34, art. 18; Hebei Family Planning
Regulations, supra note 27, art. 21.
142. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADnTION AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 43-46.
143. Heilongjiang Family Planning Regulations, supra note 38, art. 32. This document and the Jilin
Family Planning Regulations, supra note 26, art. 19, specifically ban "any working units or individuals"
from removing the IUDs.
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orders prohibiting "removing IUDs from childbearing-age women without
permission" by family-planning authorities, and making it punishable by the
criminal code. None of the regulations specify who and under what
conditions women can obtain legal permission to have IUDs removed. The
single-ring stainless steel IUD that was widely used until recently in China45
is an obsolete device, which is more likely to cause pelvic infections and
abnormal, frequent menstruation.'" Some women are simply unable to wear
IUDs; when IUDs are installed, they may be physically expelled from their
bodies. 47 The legal obstacles to obtaining exemptions from the requirement
to remove an IUD have pushed some women to resort to unauthorized and
medically risky non-clinical removals.
Some provincial regulations give women incentives to undergo certain
medically risky procedures. For instance, it is considered medically unsafe for
women to undergo sterilization within forty-eight hours after giving birth or
right after an abortion. But sterilizations are often performed immediately
following delivery or an abortion. As a reward for doing so, women in Jilin
Province, for example, receive an extended paid leave from work. A fourteen-
day paid leave is provided after abortion, and a thirty-day paid leave is offered
if one has a sterilization at the same time; if a woman has an abortion during
her second trimester, she can take thirty days off, and she can take forty days
if she has a sterilization at the same time. 1
48
The cases examined in the three sections above indicate that the problem
is greater and more substantial than isolated cases of individuals using violence
against women and children in private spheres. The Chinese state, in pursuing
its demographic goals, has failed to enforce the law and punish those who use
violence against women and children, including officials carrying out
governmental policies. Their conduct is, de facto, condoned by the state, even
though official policies and legislation seem to ban some of the violent
practices.
B. Policy Inconsistency: An Explanation of Governmental and Societal Failures
This section analyzes inconsistencies and conflicts between the birth control
policy and the incentives created by other socio-economic policies, between
various objectives of the birth-control policy itself, and the impact of such
conflicts on the dynamics of policy enforcement. The question is why the
protection of women's and children's rights has been hindered during the
144. Notification on Sabotaging Family Planning, supra note 101, at 13-1.4.
145. With the help of the U.N. Family Planning Agency, China has begun to replace the steel ring
production with modern copper IUDs. The copper IUD, however, costs approximately 1.5 yuan to
manufacture, while each steel ring IUD costs approximately 0.1 yuan.
146. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 46.
147. More than one-third of accidental, aborted pregnancies in China are reportedly attributed to IUD
failure. In a study of one county the figure was 80 percent. Conly & Camp, supra note 3, at 36.
148. Jilin Family Planning Regulations, supra note 27, art. 27.
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enforcement of the family-planning policy. The answer centers on conflicts and
inconsistencies between laws protecting women and children and the incentives
created by other government policies, such as the market-oriented agricultural
policy.
1. Conflict Between the Birth Control Policy and the Rural Economic
Reform Policy
In the late 1970s, the government adopted the "family responsibility
system" as a major initiative in its rural economic reform. It dissolved
collective farms and installed family-based economic units. Each rural family
became one self-managed farm, regulated by the government through land
contract, levies, and taxes, and responsible for its own earnings and profits.
Under the old collective farm system, the production team collectively
managed production and distribution, and members shared the burdens and
benefits. The role of family in production and income-earning functions was
not important. Also, under the old collective farm system, it was easier to
control couples' reproductive activity because birth policy enforcement was
directly tied to the allocation of benefits.
Under the new rural economic system each family largely takes care of
itself. Male children accordingly become more desirable to rural parents
because of their place in Chinese rural farm life. Families with male children
seem to enjoy an economic advantage over households with female children.
The central use of manual labor in Chinese farming appears to increase the
value of male laborers. Due to the largely traditional division of labor by
gender, males not only handle heavy agricultural duties, but also handle
disputes (for example, over land boundaries and water allocation), often
through physical fights. Females mainly take care of household chores and less
physically strenuous farming jobs.
Males are also valued because they are expected to bring more laborers
into the household. It is still common in rural China for a girl, upon marriage,
to live with her in-laws, thus leaving her own parents short of a laborer and
a helper. Couples thus deem it a "waste" to invest in their daughters'
upbringing and particularly in their school education. Moreover, if a woman
becomes a widow, she will most likely return to her parents' house with little
to make up for the time lost while she worked for her husband's parental
household.
The P.R.C. Inheritance Law and the Constitution nominally guarantee a
widow's right of inheritance from her in-laws' household.' 49 Some provincial
149. XiANFA [Constitutionl art. 13 (1982) ("The state protects by law the right of citizens to inherit
private property."); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jichengfa lInheritance Law of the People's Republic
of Chinal (1985), art. 12, (adopted Apr. 10, 1985 by the 3rd Sess. of the Sixth Nat'l People's Cong.),
translated in LAw IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 462, 464 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan
eds., 1989) [hereinafter Inheritance Law] (stating that widowed daughter-in-law who has fulfilled obligations
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family-planning regulations have prescribed some minimal incentives to induce
men to move into their wives' family homes. 50 The power of in-laws over
widows remains largely intact, however, effectively preventing a widow from
inheriting her share of property in the in-laws' household. Since a widow and
her husband lived with her in-laws, it would be unacceptable in the eyes of
her in-laws for her to "take away" her husband's property from his parents.
If she has any brothers-in-law, it is even harder for her to claim inheritance
of part of her husband's family's property, since her brothers-in-law are also
the legal heirs. The village authorities and local legal enforcement authorities
tend not to support her legal claims to inheritance, often because of their
kinship ties or local connections to the in-law families. Rural widows thus face
practical obstacles to exercising their legal right to inherit from their in-laws'
household. 151
Village authorities of the widow's parents also have incentives to withhold
the benefits and land to which she is entitled, so that the authorities can use
the benefits and land either for their own purposes or for other villagers. When
a married woman chooses not to move to her husband's village and' instead
remains in her parents' village, some local authorities still cancel her
residential registration. They may also take away her allocated land or refuse
to register her husband and children to avoid increasing the number of villagers
who must share the land and resources allocated to the village.'52
The 1992 LPWRI devotes an entire chapter to women's property rights,
providing that "a woman's entitlement to the land that is allocated to her for
growing grain rations and for residential housing construction" remains
protected after she gets married or divorced; 5 and that "[w]idowed women
who performed the major obligation in providing for their father-in-law and/or
mother-in-law shall be the first in line in the latter's legal heirs, and their right
of inheritance is not affected by the right of inheritance of the latter's sons and
daughters. 
" 54
The preference for sons is heightened by the dependence of rural parents
on their sons for old-age security. Rural parents tend to expect less old-age
security from daughters than from sons since in most rural areas daughters are
to mother- and father-in-law is first sequence heir).
150. For example, a provision of the Guangxi Family Planning Regulations awards a couple the
permission to have a second child if the husband moves to live with the wife's family, which has no son.
Guangxi Family Planning Regulations, supra note 33, art. 10, 2.
151. For a helpful discussion of the difficulties women face under ostensibly gender neutral inheritance
laws, see Jordan, supra note 76, at 74-76.
152. Id.
153. LPWRI, supra note 23, art. 30.
154. Id. art. 32. Note that Article 32 retreats from the commitments to widowed women by adding
that the law protects a widow's inheritance in the household of her parents-in-law only if she was their
major caretaker. The question of who was "the major caretaker" is the subject of potential protracted
disputes. Since the widow is often an outsider fighting alone against her brothers- and sisters-in-law and
their parents, these disputes are usually resolved to her disadvantage.
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married out to live in the household of her husband and his parents.'
Meanwhile, unlike urban families, rural peasants are not eligible for state-
subsidized benefits including health care and retirement pensions.156
Family-planning regulations have been implemented without considering
the economic insecurity of rural elderly. These regulations tend to reward
urban workers with an increase in retirement pension if they comply with the
"one child" policy.57 In this respect, family-planning regulations have
widened the disparity of living standards between the urban and rural elderly.
This gap further obstructs efforts to mitigate rural parents' preferences for
sons.
Under the rural-urban dual system for the distribution of entitlement and
duties, the current family-planning programs seem particularly insensitive to
rural women's inferior status in society and their particular needs. The fact
that violence against women and girls-forced abortion and sterilization, female
infanticide, abandonment, and concealment of female babies-occurs primarily
in rural areas can be explained by the rather limited opportunities for rural
women, and the rural population in general, to obtain an education and to
pursue income-earning jobs and economic independence.' s Women's lack
of schooling hinders them from using reproductive information, while their
lack of career opportunities gives them less motivation to use contraceptives.
These conditions may play a significant role in rural women's aversion to birth
control policy and, consequently, in their resistance to changing reproductive
practices. Their slow adaptation and resistance may explain why harsher
punishment and repression have been inflicted."'
By contrast, reproductive decisions by urban families (especially families
of state employees) are generally less directly controlled by their basic
economic needs. While seventy-five percent of urban couples may prefer two
children, most seem to have settled for one. This is because, in comparison
to rural couples, urban residents' economic well-being is less linked to the
number and sex of their children. The socio-economic system provides for
their basic needs much more adequately than it does for rural residents. Urban
155. Recent surveys show that the rural elderly rely more on their own children for old-age support
than do elderly people in urban areas. In cities and villages alike, old parents with a larger number of
children have more economic security than parents with fewer children. See Xia Chuanlin & Ma Fengli,
Impact of Number of Children on the Family Support for the Elderly, 19 RENKUO YANJIU [POPULATION
STUDIES] No.1, at 10-16 (1995).
156. The P.R.C. Labor Insurance Regulations only stipulated retirement pensions for workers and
government staff. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Baoxian Tiaoli [People's Republic of China
Labor Insurance Regulations], art. 2 (Feb. 23, 1951) in ZHONGYANG LAODONG FAGUI HUIBIAN [CENTRAL
COMMUNIST PARTY COMMrrTEE LABOR LAW COLLECTION] 247 (1953).
157. See, e.g., Heilongjiang Family Planning, supra note 39, art. 26, 1 9. The Anhui Regulation
stipulates a five percent increase of retirement pensions for state employees who have only one child. Anhui
Family Planning Regulations, supra note 57, art 20, 1 6.
158. For documentation of women's unequal employment and education opportunity and a discussion
of policy failures for their equal opportunity, see generally CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE,
supra note 1, at 62-8 1.
159. See Greenhalgh and Li, supra note 50, at 601, 609.
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residents have better access to hospitals and, until very recently, they generally
enjoyed heavily state-subsidized medical insurance. Finally, urban women have
better educational and professional opportunities.160
Birth control regulations provide better packages of compensation and
rewards for urban couples who practice contraception than for rural couples.
In fact, most "rewards" do not benefit rural couples at all. For example, in
Anhui Province, the family planning regulation promised very few benefits for
rural couples. Rewards such as extended paid leave for newlyweds who marry
at least three years later than the legal marriage-age, 1" payments for women
giving birth after age twenty-four" 2 and for parents pledging to have only
one baby'63 actually benefit only urban couples with regular salaries. Rural
women who work for their own family farms or businesses only affect their
family's own productivity when they take time off. No other employers or state
agents pay the cost of their leave.
This urban-rural dual system, which clearly disadvantages rural
populations, especially rural women, has supported the transformation of birth
control measures into further restraints on rural women and girls. This dual
system is at odds with the U.N. provision in the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that obligates state
parties to "take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and
the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their
families . . . and [to] take all appropriate measures to ensure the application
of the provisions of this Convention to women in rural areas."'"
The age-old preference for sons makes economic sense in rural farming
communities because, under the birth control policy, families cannot continue
having children until they have the desired number of sons, and there are
strong economic incentives for parents to make girls "disappear." Peasants
resist a birth control policy that threatens their economic security through sex-
selective abortions, concealment and abandonment of girls, and female
infanticide. Still, to blame the parents alone for the resort to such extreme
means is to ignore the complicity of the state in these practices. It is easy to
appreciate all that is at stake when a rural couple has only girls and cannot
legally have more children. It might seem worthwhile, from their point of
view, to risk punishment by proceeding with "out-of-plan" pregnancies in
160. See Zhang Yibing, Shixi ZJongguo Nuxing Xingguannian de Chenxiang Chayi [A Preliminary
Analysis on the Difference of Concept on Sex in Rural and Urban Areas] (Feb. 26, 1994) (discussing
findings in surveys of rural and urban women about differences in educational opportunity and views on
family, sex, and reproduction) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also Conly & Camp,
supra note 3, at 14-15 (describing significant differences between educational opportunities and literacy
rates of rural and urban women).
161. Anhui Family Planning Regulations, supra note 57, art. 20, 1.
162. Id. art. 20, 1 2.
163. Id. art. 20, 1 4.
164. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for
signature Dec. 18, 1979 [hereinafter CEDAW], art. 14, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, reprinted in 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
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order to have sons, or even to abandon or kill female infants. The conflict
between family-planning objectives and rural market pressures as well as other
legal provisions effectively has made rural couples' conventional preference
for sons a compelling socio-economically based necessity. Under economic
pressure, they perceive the "one birth per couple" requirement to be a threat
to their basic needs. Such perceived needs have motivated rural resistance to
the birth policy. The social resistance, in turn, has evoked the use of state
coercion since the government is determined to pursue its fertility goal. In this
manner, the clashes between family planning and the desires of rural couples
are intensified by clashes between family-planning policies and other
government policies. These two clashes are intertwined, resulting in political
and socio-economic causes of the use of force in family planning in rural
areas.
2. Conflict Between Reproductive Health Objectives and the Government-
Encouraged Drive for Profit
The Chinese government seems to have permitted corporate profit motives
to take priority over the reproductive health of its female employees.
Reproductive health care, promised women by the MIHCL'65 and the
Regulation on Labor Protection of Female Employees,'66 includes the
services of maternal care and maternal benefits. Increasingly, however,
market-oriented companies have disincentives to hire women of childbearing
age and are eager to withhold legally-required maternity leave payments. 67
This especially affects women during the ninety-day paid maternity leave that
is mandated by the Regulation on Labor Protection of Female Employees.6
During an efficiency adjustment of businesses in Anshan in the late 1980s,
companies laid off many workers, eighty percent of whom were female. Fifty
percent of these women were pregnant or nursing babies.'69 According to
the same source, the maternity leave requirement has also motivated companies
not to promote women to key positions or to raise their salaries. 7
165. See MIHCL, supra note 25, ch. 111.
166. Nuzhigong Laodong Baohu Guiding [Regulation on Labor Protection of Female Employees]
(Adopted 1988) arts. 8, 9 & 11, in FUNU HE WEICHENGNIANREN FALU BAOHU CHUAN SHU [COMPLETE
BOOK OF LAWS PROTECTING WOMEN AND UNDER-AGE PERSONS], (1991) 150-51 [hereinafter Regulation
on Labor Protection of Female Employees].
167. According to one estimate, the cost to a company-productivity loss plus maternity payment-for
one female employee in Wuhan, a city in central China, was about 5979.94 yuan (less than $1000) in 1987.
See Song Meiya, Daizhuo Zhengyi Zoulai di Keti [Controversial Topics], ZHONGGUO FUNU [CHINESE
WOMEN], Feb. 1987, at 19 (discussing 1987 survey by Wuhan Municipal Women's Alliance).
168. Regulation on Labor Protection of Female Employees, supra note 166, art. 8. This regulation
extended the period of paid maternity leave (with all benefits) from 56 days, as required by the 1950 P.R.C.
Labor Protection Regulations, to 90 days. But the regulation apparently only applies to state-owned and
collective enterprises, not to private, small rural collectives. Id. art. 2.
169. See Song Meiya, supra note 167, at 19.
170. Id.
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Such discriminatory hiring and promotion practices have rarely been
subjected to legal scrutiny. They have persisted despite the 1992 LPWRI's
requirement that "[n]o unit is allowed to dismiss female workers or unilaterally
terminate a labor contract on the grounds of marriage, pregnancy, maternity
leave, or lactation." 7 ' LPWRI also provides that "no discrimination against
women is allowed when it comes to promoting [to] a higher position or grade
and assessing special skills or duties."172 It seems that this law is not
enforced rigorously because the government wants to encourage profit-
maximizing businesses, the goal of the state's new economic policy.
Meanwhile, faced with reduced government spending, some cities have
begun searching for innovative ways to reduce the burden on businesses of
paying for employees' maternity leaves. In August 1988, the city of Nantong
in Jiangsu Province set up a "Women Employee Reproduction Fund" by
collecting an annual fee of twenty yuan (about $2.50) from each employee in
the city's state-owned or large collective companies. 73 This fund was to be
used to pay for the salary and benefits of employees on maternity leave. The
city of Anshan, Liaoning Province, passed a law in 1988 mandating that
maternity benefits be paid by both the husband's and the wife's companies,
instead of by the wife's alone. And Zhuzhou, Hunan Province, requires women
to take maternity leave for four years, during which time they cannot return
to work and their companies pay 100% of their salary for ninety days. For the
rest of their leave, they are paid 70% by a municipal Birth Fund, which is
funded by a 5% tax taken from the annual salary of all employees. 74
These policy experiments aim to appease companies by taking on some of
their financial responsibilities. Some of these policies, however, adversely
affect the interests of pregnant women and mothers nursing babies. In the
above case of Zhuzhou, where women are required to take a four-year
maternity leave, those women who want to return to work sooner and earn
their full salaries do not have that option. Experimental policies also confront
implementation difficulties in the collection of funds. Nantong's "Women
Employee Reproduction Fund," for example, has failed to collect the mandated
fee from companies.1 75 Similarly, in Anshan, the husband's company and
the wife's company have often refused to pay their respective shares. 76
How the state and the law can best protect women in fulfilling their dual
roles of childbearing and equal participation in the workplace is a complex
issue. As a developing country, China cannot be expected to have found the
perfect solution. The question here is whether the government is willing to
succumb to a dominant societal interest-the business interest in this case-and
171. LPWRI, supra note 24, art. 26.
172. Id. art. 24.
173. Meiya, supra note 167, at 19.
174. Id.




allow the drive for profit to override women's legal rights and legitimate
interests.
3. The Government's Unwillingness to Allocate the Necessary Funding
While the government has made family planning a national priority and has
mobilized the administrative and legal instruments necessary to enforce birth
quotas, it has not secured funding for reproductive health programs. The lack
of funding for such programs has been at least partially responsible for limiting
women's choices and creating unsafe reproductive and contraceptive practices.
The range of contraceptive methods offered to couples is quite limited. One
study found that among Chinese couples using birth control, sterilization was
the method used by 48% of women and men, while IUDs were used by 41%
of women. " To date, the state has allocated very limited funds to pay for
rural family-planning workers and their training.'78 This underfunding not
only leads to ill-prepared workers, but also makes the job financially
unattractive to qualified professionals. The result of these factors is inadequate
family-planning services. In addition, the often under-staffed "family-planning
working teams" may be given responsibility for more villages than they can
handle effectively. As a result, villages might receive visits from family-
planning workers only once or twice a year. During such visits, family-
planning and health workers, often assisted by local authorities and police,
shepherd fertile women into temporary clinics or town hospitals in order to
perform abortions and sterilizations and install IUDs.'79 The women receive
little follow-up attention to detect side effects or infection. Given the absence
of reproductive health workers, village women can have a hard time finding
health advice when they need it. If they develop medical complications when
family-planning workers and doctors are unavailable, they either must travel
long distances to clinics located in town centers or cities, or wait for the next
visit by health workers.
In its reports to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women,"'0 the government of China reiterated that its family-
planning policy aims at improving women's reproductive health. If the
government were genuinely committed to this objective it would be doing much
more to mitigate the adverse health consequences of poor quality services and
177. See Conly & Camp, supra note 3, at 30. In comparison, 5.4% used the Pill, 3.8% used condoms,
0.8% used spermicide, and 0.7% used other methods. Id.
178. The government currently spends about 100 million yuan (a little more than $10 million) each
year on family-planning programs, which is about one yuan (or $0.8) per capita. Population vs.
Development, supra note 2, at 15.
179. See CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 39-41.
180. Initial Reports of States Parties: People's Republic of China, Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5lAdd.14 (1983); Second Periodic
Reports of States Parties: People's Republic of China, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 1 th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.26 (1989).
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inadequate staffing in the family-planning networks. In particular, more
funding needs to be allocated to reproductive health services and educational
programs for women and training projects for family-planning workers.''
The government also needs to increase salaries of doctors on its payroll if it
is to attract qualified professionals. The government also could contract
reproductive health services to privatized regional hospitals. Because China's
GNP has been growing at an average annual rate of 12.2% from 1991 to
1994,112 and international family-planning agencies have provided aid," 3
the necessary funds should not be too difficult to locate. A continued failure
to secure resources for adequate reproductive services suggests a governmental
lack of will to make the health care of women and children a priority, despite
the commitment that it made to do so when it adopted the CEDAW, LPWRI
and MIHCL.
III.CHINA'S OBLIGATION TO THE U.N. TO IMPLEMENT REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
A. The Binding Force of China's U.N. Obligations
One way to assess China's efforts to protect the human rights of women
and children in its family-planning program is to measure them against
international human rights standards, both specific international covenants that
China has pledged to uphold and more general principles of international law.
As a member state of the U.N., China is obligated to comply with the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),' which set minimum conditions for membership. Though the
People's Republic of China was not among the original signatories to the
UDHR 5 or the U.N. Charter, it should be bound by them as long as it
remains a member of the U.N. The Charter seeks to promote and encourage
"respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
181. Funding for this purpose could be secured, for example, by taxing businesses. This tax can be
justified on the grounds that raising the quality of reproductive care and developing a sustainable population
program is in the interest of all members of society.
182. 1995 WHITE PAPER, supra note 63, at 13.
183. The Chinese government has acknowledged that the "United Nations has, during the past thirteen
years, provided valuable assistance to the population and family planning program in China .... They
have given an impetus to the enhancement of the demographic research capacity and to the continuous
improvement in the population and family planning program." P.R.C. Report to Cairo Conference on
Population and Development, supra note 26, at 56.
184. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHRI.
185. The Republic of China signed the UDHR in 1948. The People's Republic of China then declared
that the Republic of China's "signature and ratification of, or accession to, any multilateral treaties by
usurping the name of 'China' are all illegal and null and void." CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS
OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS at 20 n.2, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/5, U.N. Sales No. E.87.XIV.2 (1987).
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distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,"' and "[to] be a centre
for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common
ends."' 87 The UDHR is billed as "a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations."1"  China has recently endorsed this document.'
At the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in 1994,
China, together with other participating countries, affirmed that all people are
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR, stressing that
"[h]uman beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development.
. . . People are the most important and valuable resource of any nation...
[and] the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement
of internationally recognized human rights. " '
Though China has not become a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 9' and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 92 it has signed and ratified a number of other
U.N. instruments concerning special areas of human rights.'93 Notably,
China has signed the CEDAW 9 4 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Children's Convention). 9" Thus China ostensibly has undertaken the
duties of compliance which these instruments set forth. For example, China
must report on its progress to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women within one year of ratification and every four
years thereafter, evaluating its own level of compliance, reporting the
186. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, 3.
187. Id. art. 1, 4.
188. UDHR, supra note 184, Preamble.
189. In his September, 1988 speech to the 43d Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the
Chinese Foreign Minister stated that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights lis] the first international
instrument which systematically sets forth the specific contents regarding respect for and protection of
fundamental human rights." 1991 WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 43.
190. Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, supra note 20, at 14.
191. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368.
192. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
193. These include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027, as Pnodified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). See
1991 WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 43-44.
194. The P.R.C. National People's Congress ratified CEDAW in September 1980. See CAUGHT
BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 93.
195. Children's Convention, supra note 67. The Chinese government signed the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on August 29, 1990 and presented the ratification instrument to the United Nations on
March 2, 1992. Envoy Ratifies Child Rights Convention, BEllING XINHUA, Mar. 2, 1992, reprinted in FBIS-
CHI-92-042, Mar. 3, 1992, at 1. For discussion of China's substantive obligations under the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, see infra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
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legislative and judicial steps taken in order to comply, and explaining
difficulties preventing satisfactory compliance with the convention. 1
9 6
U.N. human rights norms, however, do not operate as binding law. Though
the existence of these norms facilitates the assessment and criticism of member
states' practices, the breach of these norms does not command legal sanctions.
For example, the documents drawn up at the 1994 Cairo Population
Conference197 and the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference,19 have virtually
no legally binding effect,'" though such documents could set standards to
help pressure governments to reform laws and practices which involve
discrimination and violence against women. Because no sanctions attached,
member states' obligations under the U.N. Charter and UDHR embody only
aspirational norms in that they are pledges by member states to reform their
current institutions and legal practices in order to work toward a future of
greater respect for these rights. It also means that these states should be
accountable to the U.N. community for their breach of such norms: they must
explain what violations exist and why.
At least an explanation is due which would then be subjected to scrutiny
by panels of experts, such as the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, with relative independence from the political
dealings at the U.N. Member states must reply to and address the concerns
and doubts raised by these panels.
Such rudimentary accountability gives meaning to the applicability of
international rights conventions to state parties. The Chinese government's
recognition of international rights conventions signals that the government no
longer openly denies the validity of the norms set forth in these conventions.
Rather, the government now argues that it has behaved according to
conventional norms. In other words, the Chinese government has entered a
dialogue-open to the scrutiny of the international community-about what
constitutes compliance and violation. Such engagement is a marked step
forward from the prior policy of outright rejection of human rights.
196. CEDAW, supra note 164, art. 18, 1, 2. China has submitted two reports, one in 1983 and
one in 1989. Initial Reports of States Parties: People's Republic of China. supra note 180; Second Reports
of States Parties: People's Republic of China, supra note 180.
197. See Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, supra note 20.
198. The main document is the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Report of the Fourth
World Conference on Women, at 4-132, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995). [hereinafter Beijing Platform
for ActionJ.
199. For example, after the U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women resolved in a consensus
"Platform for Action" that governments should not use coercive laws to control women's ability to choose
the number of children they have, China announced that it would stick to its strict birth control policy
anyway. Steven Mufson, U.N. Women's Meeting Settles Key Disputes, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at
A1S. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian noted in this vein that U.N. documents "are only
recommendations and are not legally binding." Id.
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B. Relevant U.N. Human Rights Instruments
In this section, I discuss the rights violations that have persisted as part of
China's campaign to control population in light of international human rights
norms. The discussion covers three related areas: reproductive rights, women's
rights, and the rights of children.
1. The International Conventions on Reproductive Freedom
According to international norms, reproductive rights as basic human rights
are both "positive" and "negative" rights; they include both rights to be
provided with certain resources or services and rights not to suffer interference
with certain actions." Women's negative reproductive rights include the
right to freedom from state interference in their decisions about the number,
timing and spacing of births. This freedom was affirmed by the Teheran
Declaration adopted at the 1968 U.N. Human Rights Conference.2"'
Women's positive reproductive rights include the right to state-provided
reproductive health services and access to reproductive health information. The
understanding of reproductive rights was expanded to include this positive
freedom at the 1978 International Conference on Health Care.2 2 Both the
negative and positive components of reproductive rights were affirmed in
CEDAW.203 Article 16 of CEDAW states:
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to . . . ensure, on a
basis of equality of men and women . . . the same rights to decide
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and
to have access to the information, education and means to enable them
to exercise these rights .... 20
Under the Chinese policy, however, women clearly do not have the
negative freedom to make reproductive choices regarding the number and
timing of births. The Chinese government's violations of women's positive
200. See THOMAS NAGEL, Equality, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 106, 114-15 (1979) (discussing distinction
between positive and negative rights); see also MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973).
But see HENRY SHuE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-64 (1980)
(critiquing distinction).
201. Declaration of Teheran, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 41, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41
(1968). The right has been affirmed in the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res.
2542, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1960); the World Population Plan of Action of
Bucharest, United Nations World Population Conference, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.60/19 (1974); the Report
of the World Conference of the International Women's Year at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.66/34, U.N. Sales.
No. E.76.IV. 1 (1976); and the Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 198.
202. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION & UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, Primary Health Care:
Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care 2 (1978) (discussing reproductive health
care as essential component of a country's health care system).
203. CEDAW, supra note 164, art. 16, 1.
204. Id.
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rights under CEDAW are only slightly less obvious. A positive right to obtain
reproductive services implies that couples can choose freely from a range of
available services and contraception methods. China provides a fixed means
of contraception and enforces its use. China's family-planning program claims
to provide reproductive services and access to information.' 5 In fact, it
restricts women's reproductive choices through its compulsory birth control
measures.2' There are also problems with the quality of reproductive
counseling and services, especially in rural areas, and problems with
government failure to secure sufficient funding for adequate quality care. Many
family-planning personnel are poorly trained and lack the knowledge necessary
to advise couples fully on the risks and benefits of different contraceptive
methods.
Article 16 of the CEDAW stipulates that individuals' voluntary cooperation
with a state's family-planning policies and their reproductive autonomy are
essential to reproductive rights. 7 However, some might argue that Section
16's phrase "freely and responsibly" implicitly condones efforts by the state
to enforce "responsible" reproduction by couples, that is, reproduction that
is "responsible" toward society and the public interest.208 This concern may
not be completely unfounded, but, in balancing personal "responsibility" and
"freedom," the CEDAW in no way authorizes the state to use compulsory
means to enforce "responsibility."
2. International Conventions on Eliminating Discrimination and Violence
against Women
Women's rights have been affirmed repeatedly by major U.N. human rights
instruments. Both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) reaffirmed the equal rights of men and women.2' The
elimination of discrimination and violence against women was the focus of the
1993 World Conference on Human Rights and its Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW)."21 CEDAW requires
state parties to take "all appropriate measures" to ensure "the practical
realization" of equality,2 ' the elimination of discrimination, and "the full
advancement and development of women."212 DEVAW recognized violence
against women as a violation of human rights. DEVAW defined "violence
205. The official claim is that 75% of couples of child-bearing age in China currently have access
to family-planning methods. Population vs. Development, supra note 2, at 12.
206. See supra Part l1.B.
207. CEDAW, supra note 164, art. 16, 1.
208. Id.
209. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 13, b; UDHR, supra note 184, Preamble.
210. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1049 Ihereinafter DEVAW].
211. CEDAW, supra note 164, arts. 1-2, 4-5.
212. Id. art. 3.
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against women" as "act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely
to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women."213 It requires states to pursue by all appropriate means and without
delay a policy of eliminating violence against women.2"4 DEVAW required
further that states take proactive measures to change social practices, as
opposed to simply blaming "custom, tradition or religious consideration" for
the persistence of social violence against women.2 5
More recently, member states of the U.N., recognizing that women's rights
are human rights, articulated the obligation to eliminate violence against
women in relation to population and development projects:
Advancing gender equality and equity and the empowerment of women,
and the elimination of all kinds of violence against women, and
ensuring women's ability to control their own fertility, are cornerstones
of population and development related programmes. The human rights
of women and the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of universal human rights.216
China's family-planning policy and its implementation of that policy clash
with these articulations of the rights of women and female children. The
government has not lived up to its obligations as a state party under CEDAW,
particularly with regard to its obligation "[t]o modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customs and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women."217
3. International Convention on the Rights of the Child
Finally, international conventions with a focus on protecting children's
rights provide another yardstick for measuring China's population control
programs. The rights of children to special safeguards and care were
recognized in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,218  the
International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights,21 9 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' ° and the U.N.
213. DEVAW, supra note 210, art. 1.
214. Id. art. 4.
215. Id. art. 4.
216. Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, supra note 20, at 15.
217. CEDAW, supra note 164, art. 5.
218. UDHR, supra note 184, art. 25 ("Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance.").
219. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 192, art. 10.
220. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 191, art. 23 1 4, art. 24.
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Convention on the Rights of the Child.22" ' China thus has agreed to "respect
and ensure"222 the rights of children and to "undertake all appropriate
legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation" of the
rights of each child within its jurisdiction, as set forth in the Children's
Convention.2 3
Particularly relevant to our assessment of China's family-planning programs
are the Children's Convention's protections of all children's "inherent right
to life,"224 the right "to be registered immediately after birth [and] the right
to acquire a nationality, "225 the right "to the highest attainable standard of
health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of
health, "226 the right "to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical,
mental, spiritual, moral and social development,"227 and, finally, the right
"to education."228
Contrary to its official endorsement of these rights, however, China has
systematically breached them in its campaign to control population. The
government-authorized ban on out-of-plan children, and the lack of
enforcement of penalties against cruel and abusive treatment of female
children,229 violate the rights of children enshrined in Articles 6, 7, 24, 27,
and 28 of the Children's Convention. The punishment of out-of-plan children
is also a breach of Article 2, which specifically urges states parties to "take
all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms
of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family
members."3° Yet, when Chinese parents fail to observe the population quota
or take mandatory contraceptives, their children are punished.
C. China's Responses to the Probing of the United Nations
Responses to the U.N. from China have included flawed or one-sided
accounts.' Moreover, China's reaction to criticism of its overall human
rights record appeals to culturally-specific interpretations of international
norms. For example, in two official "White Papers" on human rights, the
Chinese government, contradicting its statement endorsing the UDHR, has
insisted that it is entitled to its own understanding of human rights. China's
221. Children's Convention, supra note 67.
222. Id. art. 2.
223. Id. art. 4.
224. Id. art. 6.
225. Id. art. 7.
226. Id. art. 24.
227. Id. art. 27.
228. Id. art. 28.
229. See supra Part 11.
230. Children's Convention, supra note 67, art. 2.
231. For a critical analysis of China's reports to the U.N., see CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADmON AND
THE STATE, supra note 1, at 93-102.
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understanding of human rights, the government explained, emphasizes the right
to subsistence and development, the evaluation of collective versus individual
rights, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the concept of international
rights as interventionist in internal affairs. 2
In response to criticisms of this nature, the government has also tried to
defend its record. One official statement asserted that "[s]trong measures have
been adopted against unlawful cruel treatment of women." 3 This statement,
however, does not mention practices such as forced abortion and sterilization.
As a signatory to the CEDAW, China is obligated to report to the U.N. on
its progress and failures in taking measures against discrimination and violence
against women. However, in its reports thus far, China has not given adequate
and full accounts of the gaps in its implementation of the CEDAW. In the two
reports made to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 4 China listed legislation related to equality and the
elimination of discrimination against women, such as the 1982
Constitution,"' the Marriage Law, 6 the Inheritance Law, 7 and some
provisions on prostitution in the Criminal Law."' These reports, however,
discuss minimally how the objectives set by the laws are to be implemented
or what measures have been taken to give effect to these laws. 9 The reports
generally blamed traditional biases as the main obstacle to women's equal
treatment.
In the second report to the CEDAW Committee, some details were offered
to demonstrate China's efforts to ensure women's access to health care
services, including reproductive health care and family planning. The details,
however, focused on the number of family-planning workers, gynecologists
and hospitals. The report did not address the issue of discrimination and
violence against women and female children associated with the family-
planning policy and its implementation. When questioned about the level of
violence against women in China by experts on the U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, China's representatives replied
elusively that "violence against women had not been a serious social problem
in China. "24
With respect to children's rights, as a result of signing the Children's
Convention, the Chinese government is similarly obligated to respond to U.N.
cross-examinations. The government's responses to questions from a U.N.
232. See 1991 WHITE PAPER, supra note 19; 1995 WHITE PAPER, supra note 63.
233. The Situation of Chinese Women, BEIIING REVIEW, June 6-12, 1994, at 20.
234. Initial Reports of States Parties: People's Republic of China, supra note 180; Second Periodic
Reports of States Parties: People's Republic of China, supra note 180.
235. XIANFA [Constitutionl (1982).
236. Marriage Law, supra note 12.
237. Inheritance Law, supra note 149.
238. Criminal Law, supra note 109.
239. CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE STATE, supra note 1, at 93-102.
240. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess., at 47, 171, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
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special committee on the rights of the child are expected to be submitted in
summer 1996.
IV. CONCLUSION: POLICY ALTERNATIVES
In order to respect the rights of women and children while pursuing its
family-planning programs, the Chinese government must take concrete steps
to counter the underlying pressures on families to have male children and the
social violence against women and baby girls. Policy alternatives to the ones
that have been in practice may include the following proposals.
A. Shifts in Policy Emphasis
In order to comply with international norms of reproductive rights, the
emphasis of Chinese family-planning programs should shift from rigid
demographic objectives (such as the fixed birth quota and fertility rate) to
improving the quality of reproductive health care, expanding couples'
reproductive choices, and enhancing counseling services. As some health and
development experts and demographers have come to agree, programs designed
to succeed in meeting these objectives will be more effective in reducing the
size of the population.241 Such programs focus on providing a wider range
of choice of contraceptive methods, instead of forcing couples to rely on a
small range of methods-such as IUDs for a woman after her first birth, and
abortion or sterilization after the second birth-which increase women's health
risks and medical complications. Government spending on family planning
should accordingly shift toward better education and counseling programs. For
example, to ensure female student enrollment in schools, especially in poor
rural areas, the government could give parents tax incentives for sending their
daughters to school and grant girls from poor rural families need-based
financial aid or increase the amount of such aid if similar programs are already
in place.
This shift in policy emphasis may result in a short-term spurt in the fertility
rate. But over the long term such programs will empower women to make
informed choices and stabilize reduced family size, a trend that has been
observed in major Chinese cities where the rate of literacy (and women's
literacy in particular) is higher and reproductive information more
accessible.24
241. See, e.g., Conly & Camp, supra note 3, at 40-41.
242. Since the late 1980s, the average number of births per woman has stabilized at 1.47 in Shanghai,
1.55 in Beijing, and 1.8 in Tianjin. Id. at 11. According to one researcher, data from the 1988 national
population control study suggested that illiterate women between the ages of 45 and 49 had on average 4.1
children, while women in the same age group with more education had 2.14 children. Tan Lin, On the




In accordance with this shift of policy objectives, certain enforcement
measures will have to be abandoned, such as penalties that punish children and
deprive them of the opportunity for healthy early-childhood development. The
government must act to repeal policy measures that implicitly tolerate,
condone, or perpetuate infanticide, abandonment, abuse, and neglect of female
children. For example, the government could sponsor investigations or allow
independent investigations by international monitoring organizations (such as
the United Nations Family Planning Agency) of the "missing girls," make
special efforts to register "hidden" girls, grant them legal status, and ensure
their entitlement to state subsidies. The government also should allow scientists
and health experts to debate eugenics policy openly, facilitate education-
oriented programs that aim at training policy-makers and health officials, and
popularize scientific understanding of the genetic basis of hereditary diseases.
Furthermore, the legal provision requiring that the disabled or their families
must voluntarily agree to sterilization should be strictly respected by
enforcement officials.
B. Legislative and Judicial Reforms
Existing laws protecting the health, sexual, and reproductive rights of
women (especially the LPWRI) and laws protecting the rights of children (the
MIHCL) should be amended with concrete and credible implementation
procedures. The legal/judicial system should have the power, independent of
that of governmental authorities, to enforce the LPWRI, the MIHCL, the
Criminal Law and administrative laws, in order to penalize governmental
officials who use force illegally to achieve government family-planning
objectives.
The Chinese government must pass concrete penalties to enable the LPWRI
and MIHCL to protect women and female children from discrimination and
violence. Moreover, the government must alter current law enforcement
practice, which punishes leniently (if at all) family members who abuse their
children. Finally, because children who have been abused, injured or killed
cannot file complaints, the state should act as prosecutor instead of insisting
that the victims (or their parents or guardians) file lawsuits, as is currently the
case. With respect to members outside the children's family, family-planning
officials, doctors and nurses should be strictly prohibited from killing or
authorizing the killing of babies born alive after induced labor. Such crimes
should be prosecuted as homicide in accordance with the criminal code.
Moreover, specific penalties for such crimes, or reference to the relevant
criminal statutes, should be incorporated into the LPWRI. The prohibitions and
prosecutions should be publicized in order to educate both governmental
officials and ordinary citizens that the criminal justice system treats the use
of violence against women and children as punishable crimes.
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In the long run, legal reforms are necessary to bringing China's fertility
policies into conformity with its international obligations to protect the rights
of women and children, as well as with its domestic laws. Granting autonomy
to the legislative and judicial bodies, as one major component of legal reform,
would help reduce arbitrariness in policy making.
C. Toward Policy Cohesion and Broader Social Reforms
The conflict between the rural "family responsibility" economic policy and
the birth control policy can be resolved by taking concrete measures to provide
economic security for the rural poor. Such measures would include:
(1) Giving tax incentives to men who "married into" their spouse's parental
homes or home villages. Also, expanding the opportunities for rural young
women to receive professional training and income-earning jobs will help them
to reach parity with young males in their ability to provide for their families
and assist aging parents.
(2) Giving family farms and small businesses economic incentives (such
as business tax breaks or reduced levies) for employing non-family-member
laborers. Rural families would then become less dependent on their own male
children for heavy-duty tasks.
(3) Reforming the current social security and retirement pension systems
to respond to the needs of a vast rural population at a time of increasing
privatization. The new system should reduce favoritism toward state-employed
urban residents. Furthermore, financial security for rural elders will help to
reduce the economic incentives to prefer sons. Experiments conducted in some
cities with insurance and saving plans for families without sons or with only
one child are instructive. Special efforts must be made to address the issue of
old-age security at the national level and to bring the rural poor into a sound
social security system.
To conclude, the Chinese government's policies, as well as its legal system
failures, are the major culprits behind the use of violence and discrimination
against women, children, and particularly baby girls in the implementation of
family-planning campaigns. State policies encourage such violations. Where
government legislation for the protection of women and children exists, there
are few concrete or credible enforcement measures attached. The state picks
and chooses among its laws, enforcing only those laws that promote its
political objectives while neglecting to enforce other laws. Moreover, while
the government blames cultural tradition for violence against women and
female children, its own inconsistency and the conflicts between population
policy and other social-economic policies tend to enhance social prejudices
against women and promote subjugation of the female sex and violence against
women. Economically-motivated social resistance to family planning reinforces
state coercion and further intensifies violence. Though they have limited
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binding force, international human rights norms provide the proper measuring
device for assessing Chinese population policy and practices. While the
government fails to live up to its international obligations, it has, nevertheless,
engaged in a dialogue by attempting to defend its record to the international
community. But to live up to its claim as the "liberator" of women, the
guardian of children, and the champion of social-economic rights and harmony
between society and family, the Chinese government must make major political
and legal reforms.

